EU Merger Control:
Policy Communities and Private Interests
Abstract
This paper analyses the formulation of the EU Merger Control Regulation (MCR) and its
implementation via the 1992 Nestlé/Perrier merger. It offers two arguments. First, these
phases of policy development occurred in ‘macro’ and ‘micro’ policy communities found
at the supranational level of governance. The first community consists of larger
Commission and business interests that formulated the MCR and the second of specific
actors within the ‘macro’ community - the Merger Task Force and the firms - that
implemented the rules. Secondly, the development of these communities can be
explained by private interest theory. The conclusions highlight two main lessons for
students of comparative European politics. First, the concept of ‘macro’ and ‘micro’
communities existing at both the formulation and implementation phases of policy offers
a framework for comparativists to better analyse which types of actors will interact
during different stages of the policy-making process. It is argued that while the (larger)
‘macro’ community helps define the nature of the regulations, a related, but not
necessarily equally composed, ‘micro’ community eventually implements the rules,
potentially changing the nature of the policy itself via a ‘feedback’ mechanism. Secondly,
this study suggests that comparativists must pay more attention to the private interests of
policy-makers and how these are intertwined with their ‘private fears.’ Such interests and
fears guide policy-makers while simultaneously constrain them from acting alone.