In summary, the purported objective of the Development Box proposal is to reduce rural
poverty and food insecurity and to promote, or at least not constrain, the policy autonomy of
developing countries in pursuit of these goals. As in the general debate on S&D treatment,
there is a tension between those who argue for increased flexibility for developing countries
on one or more of the above grounds, and those who argue that the danger to development is
not the WTO disciplines but the flexibility to avoid them. Sharma (2002) points out:
“Especially in the circle of trade negotiators and policy makers, there is a tendency to
associate less binding commitments with positive experience, in which case a negative
experience would be where the rules and commitments restricted actions” (italics in original).
For other observers, the great benefit of the AoA is indeed that it locks in policy reform.
Preserving resources and employment in traditional structures of farming can slow the process
of adjustment to more productive activities and reduce economic growth.
There may be good reasons why developing countries may want to adopt policies that support
or protect poor farmers in ways that are not always economically optimal. The most common
explanation is that alternative forms of support (direct income support, safety nets) are often
not practical in reality due to fiscal or administrative constraints (Ruffer et al., 2002).
Governments may therefore choose to pursue second best solutions to problems of rural
poverty and food security even at the cost of economic distortions. One criterion to judge
Development Box proposals is whether they address a real problem which cannot be resolved
in some other way.
Based on these considerations, a set of criteria are proposed for use in evaluating
Development Box proposals.
• First, would the measures proposed really help to improve food security, alleviate
poverty and promote sustainable agricultural growth in developing countries?
• Second, would the additional policy flexibility actually be of value to developing
countries? Would they use it?
• Third, what ‘price’ might have to be paid to gain acceptance for these concessions?
This will depend on the willingness of developed countries to countenance
concessions which, in turn, will depend on how trade-distorting (and thus damaging
to their own producers) they expect them to be, and whether they perceive the
measures to be an opt-out from liberalisation or motivated by a desire to address a
specific policy problem.
• Fourth, would protective measures undertaken under the cover of the Development
Box adversely affect other developing countries? Developing countries are an
increasingly important export market for other developing countries. Although
Development Box measures are often seen as protecting developing countries against
competition from developed countries, their use in practice may be more damaging to
developing country suppliers.
4. Development Box proposals
Tariff exemptions
The right to exempt particular food security products from further tariff reductions or indeed
from tariff disciplines altogether, under either a positive or negative list approach, is the key
component of the Development Box. Raising tariffs is attractive to a food-importing country
because it can raise producer prices at low fiscal cost. However, many developing countries
do not make full use of their existing tariff flexibility, suggesting that looking for additional
flexibility would be a relatively poor deal in negotiating terms. On the other hand, if further
tariff reductions are agreed under the Doha Round, tariff bindings could become more
restrictive, and additional flexibility would become more valuable.
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