of price support, input subsidies and border protection in order to provide the production
incentives required (Pearce and Morrison, 2001). Other commentators draw a different
conclusion from the same diagnosis of weak agricultural structures. They argue that the
underlying causes of these shortcomings need to be addressed if the potential benefits of trade
liberalisation are to be realised. The role of S&D treatment is to give developing countries
some breathing space to address the inadequacies in their domestic economies, which is an
argument for longer transition periods, not for exemptions (Roberts et al., 2002).
The food security argument. The need to take account of the development needs of
developing countries, including food security and rural development, was reaffirmed in the
Doha Declaration (para. 13). Many developing countries believe that a high level of food self-
sufficiency is a necessary condition of food security, and fear that agricultural trade
liberalisation will increase their dependence on imported foodstuffs. Providing protection for
the domestic production of food staples is thus seen as an important route to food security.
But proponents of trade reform point out that national food self-sufficiency in itself is no
guarantee of household food security where problems of access and utilisation persist (Gulati,
2000). There is also potentially a very high cost in pursuing a food self-sufficiency strategy to
food security if resources are attracted into relatively unproductive sectors at the expense of
foregoing more remunerative opportunities elsewhere.
The protection of the weak argument. While acknowledging that opening developing
economies to international trade along comparative advantage lines can potentially make a
bigger contribution to food security, critics point out that the impacts can vary greatly across
different categories of farmers and also within households depending on the role of women in
food production. In many countries, the poorer and more food-insecure farmers may not be in
a position to take advantage of trade and may even find their livelihoods undermined (FAO,
2003). However, trade policy is a very blunt instrument to address problems where rural
communities and small farmers may be excluded from or damaged by open markets. More
targeted investment policies and social safety nets are likely to be much more effective
instruments to address these problems rather than border protection.
The vulnerability argument. Developing countries, and especially low-income farmers in
these countries, are more vulnerable to the adjustment pressures caused by open trade
policies. Given that the biggest source of price variability arises from domestic causes, the
availability of trade plays an important role in price stabilisation. However, this does not
diminish the argument that the world market can itself be a source of instability. Such
pressures are of two kinds: (a) the transmission of the low points of fluctuations in world
market prices into domestic markets, putting additional pressure on low-income farmers, and
(b) the possibility of import surges. Add to this the more limited capacity of both private
farmers and public institutions in developing countries to adapt to and mitigate the
consequences of such instability. Both arguments may justify the maintenance of border
protection measures to limit the transmission of world market variability into the markets of
developing but not developed countries.
The asymmetry of support argument. Finally, for many developing countries, Development
Box measures are justified by the context that developed countries have the right to continue
to provide significant subsidies and support to their farmers, while the rights of developing
countries under the same Agreement are much more limited. Here the question to be asked is
whether developing countries would not be more successful in tackling the root causes of
these inequities directly through seeking more effective market access conditions and greater
disciplines on developed countries’ use of trade-distorting support, rather than seeking to
avoid the adverse effects of these policies by reinforcing their own protectionist policies in
return.
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