Table 10: SECTOR SWITCHING AND EXIT DETERMINANTS
Firm Specific Explanations, continued
|
SW2 (INC) |
EXIT (INC) |
SW2 (EXIT) | |
|
(1) |
(2) |
(3) | |
|
Firm specific variables | |||
|
Relative efficiency (weighted) |
-9.7675 |
-18.1121*** |
5.3856 |
|
(1.54) |
(2.61) |
(0.35) | |
|
Firm size (log) |
-0.1018*** |
-0.1963*** |
0.0703** |
|
(5.25) |
(8.38) |
(1.97) | |
|
Firm age (log) |
-0.1219*** |
0.0148 |
-0.1465** |
|
(3.03) |
(0.41) |
(2.02) | |
|
State owned enterprise (SOE) |
-0.5023*** |
0.5015*** |
-1.3764*** |
|
(5.01) |
(6.59) |
(7.86) | |
|
Foreign owned firm (Multinational) |
-0.2528*** |
-0.4323*** |
0.3400** |
|
(3.26) |
(4.94) |
(2.10) | |
|
Provincial dummies |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
|
Sector dummies_________________ |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
|
Observations |
22,426 |
23,287 |
3,013 |
|
Groups |
9,705 |
10,316 |
2,850 |
|
Log Likelihood |
-3704.26 |
-6356.28 |
-1611.30 |
|
Wald (chi-sq) |
770.98 |
211.18 |
386.95 |
|
Likelihood ratio test (p-value)______ |
0.00 |
0.00 |
0.00 |
Note: See Table 9 for details.
40
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