Table D: CONDITIONAL FIXED EFFECTS LOGIT
Industry Switching Firm Exit
(1) |
(2) |
(3) |
(4) |
(5) |
(6) | |
Firm specific variables | ||||||
Relative efficiency (weighted) |
-75.4019** |
-86.7263** |
-105.9120** |
-146.5913** |
-137.6718** |
-134.8633** |
(2.06) |
(2.26) |
(2.61) |
(2.18) |
(2.08) |
(2.05) | |
Firm size (log) |
0.1710 |
0.2075 |
-0.1325 |
-0.1514 | ||
(1.37) |
(1.61) |
(1.22) |
(1.38) | |||
State owned enterprise (SOE) |
1.5040 |
1.5396 |
0.6695 |
0.6702 | ||
(1.19) |
(1.13) |
(0.89) |
(0.89) | |||
Sector dummies____________ |
No |
No |
Yes |
No |
No |
Yes |
Observations |
1,787 |
1,787 |
1,787 |
2,558 |
2,558 |
2,558 |
Groups |
695 |
695 |
695 |
1,072 |
1,072 |
1,072 |
Log Likelihood |
-640.18 |
-638.55 |
-627.17 |
-907.92 |
-906.76 |
-894.06 |
LR (p-value)________________ |
0.02 |
0.04 |
0.07 |
0.01 |
0.04 |
0.01 |
Note: Dependent variable: Sector switching (SW2) or firm exit (EXIT). Conditional fixed effects logit estimates. t-values reported in
parenthesis. *, **, *** indicate significance at a 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. The total number of sector switchers and exits are
773 and 1,072 in the unbalanced panel, respectively.
46
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