the US, in part because the Danish system has a more egalitarian focus and in part because the
Danish welfare system provides a much better safety net than the American system. If the
safety net is a concern, then this association is also likely to differ across households within a
country. For example, welfare is a safety net primarily for those with low earnings potential,
thus, relative earnings power may be less highly associated with time use for lower income
households than for higher income households. In the US, welfare is primarily a safety net
for households with children and so the impact of the welfare system may be felt more
strongly in the US in households with children. Even so, the benefits accruing to households
with children are greater in Denmark than in the US (Bradshaw and Finch 2002) so Danes
with children may also respond less to power considerations than Danes without children.
In the case of a higher θ, cF and LF should both increase or at least should jointly act to
increase utility as both consumption and leisure enter directly into the household utility
function. Although there are numerous studies looking at the impact bargaining power has
upon time spent on and share of household chores, the theoretical impact of an increase in θ
on HF is not clear (Pollak 2005). If the woman cares more for the household good than the
man, total household production should increase with θ. To do so, at least one of the inputs,
HF or HM, must increase. However, if the man cares more for the household good, then total
household production may decrease with θ. Thus, despite the focus of most of the literature
on housework time, the effect of θ on the time spent on household chores is not clearly
predicted by the theory unless housework time is fixed and not enjoyable so that the only
issue to be negotiated is who will do the work. In general, we believe an analysis of leisure
time will provide clearer feedback on the role of power in intrahousehold decision making
than an analysis of housework time.3
13