their former husbands following divorce, somewhat less if they were working full-time before
the breakup. By contrast, a Norwegian study (Bratberg and Tj0tta 2008) indicates that with
the child support system in place there, divorce has an almost income-neutral effect.
Denmark’s system is much more similar to that in place in Norway than to the US system,
suggesting again that Danish individuals with less economic power may have more
negotiating power than US individuals with less economic power. 1
Second, we use information on relative education rather than relative earnings or
relative wages to reflect individuals’ „power’ within the household. Education level is, along
with work experience, clearly a major determinant of earnings so these measures are likely
highly correlated. Unlike work experience, however, individuals typically invest in education
when they are young. Thus, relative education levels are likely known or foreseen clearly at
the time of union and so more likely to have a greater influence on power early in a
relationship before specialization occurs and tasks are divided. While tasks may be
reallocated over time (and there is evidence this does happen with the arrival of children in a
household - see Lundberg and Rose (1999)), it is unlikely that they are reallocated as often as
work experience and wages change. Thus, education is likely a more reliable measure of
relative earnings power. Of course another advantage associated with relative education
versus relative earnings is that it is observed for every individual and not subject to selection
bias. We are not the first to use this yardstick for power. Evertsson and Nermo (2004)
control for relative education, as well as relative earnings and relative occupation, in their
analysis of time use.
Third, the vast majority of the literature on intrahousehold time allocation and power
is focused on an analysis of housework time. However, as has been emphasized repeatedly by