Are Japanese bureaucrats politically stronger than farmers?: The political economy of Japan's rice set-aside program

representing farmer’s grievances and political pressure.

PPi = (EIi, PFi)

DSAi = f (PPi) = F (EIi, PFi)

PPi : Political pressure of i prefecture to bureaucrats

DSAi: The degree of the burden of set-aside assignment imposed on i prefecture by the
government

EIi: The average expected income per day from rice production in i prefecture

PFi: The share of households with part-time farmers in all households conducting
agricultural activities in i prefecture

Expected signs are as follows:

∂DSA i / ∂EIi < 0

∂DSA i / ∂PFi < 0

Here, suppose that stronger political pressure in a certain prefecture makes bureaucrats
revise and reduce its allocation to a larger extent. Consequently, it is expected that the
degree of burden of set-aside assignment among prefectures is inversely proportionate
to the level of average expected income and the share of households with part-time
farmers.

Hypothesis 2 was tested by a multiple-regression consisting of the three
explanatory variables. These variables were selected from the list of factors which are
made public to be used in the formula of calculating allocations, as shown in Table 1.
Since variables included in this multiple-regression are selected from the list above,
they cannot cover all factors used in allocation calculations. Moreover, the purpose of
analyzing this regression is not to verify the validity of explanatory variables, but to find

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