Are Japanese bureaucrats politically stronger than farmers?: The political economy of Japan's rice set-aside program



Table 3 Result of Estimation (Regressions Relating to Bureaucrats’ Discretion)

Fiscal

Share of households

Average cost per bag

Share of Jishu- ryutsu-

Adjusted R

year

with full- time farmers

of rice

mai (High quality rice)

Square (R2)

(FTF)

(COST)

(JISHU)

1980

0.10353(1.42346)

0.49015**(2.54991)

-0.14620**(-2.36458)

0.319883

1981

0.06347(0.92714)

0.49110* (1.82013)

-0.13948**(-2.50822)

0.233590

1982

0.06685(1.03292)

0.52976**(2.65238)

-0.11905**(-2.10339)

0.296930

1983

0.09894(1.48625)

0.66166***(3.08470)

-0.14607**(-2.51483)

0.357808

1984

0.15233**(2.46090)

1.06927***(4.81020)

-0.15546***(-3.02321)

0.492769

**(2.10653)

**(5.05181)

**(-2.68382)

1985

0.10389(1.49822)

0.66808***(3.51768)

-0.19554***(-3.50770)

0.410533

1986

0.14011**(2.13317)

1.11849***(4.63530)

-0.14939***(-2.86602)

0.498465

1987

0.12383**(2.52331)

0.79062***(5.09708)

-0.09852**(-2.49713)

0.510986

1988

0.08896*(1.69799)

0.70547***(3.41447)

-0.12913**(-2.50536)

0.378622

(1.49682)

***(3.85892)

*(-1.86693)

1989

0.17634***(3.88629)

1.02499***(5.61896)

-0.29165**(-2.15429)

0.487166

1990

0.14211***(3.41031)

0.70068***(4.97968)

-0.14433**(-2.68288)

0.577618

1991

0.07639 (1.62473)

0.33884**(2.45223)

-0.26155***(-3.48585)

0.365581

1992

0.08941 *(1.95487)

0.81918***(4.86336)

-0.29334***(-3.67120)

0.498842

1993

0.16841***(3.19447)

0.93959***(4.36878)

-0.98989 (-1.11960)

0.379464

1994

0.32378***(4.70731)

1.55627***(5.34282)

-0.32353**(-2.53926)

0.566989

1995

0.19951***(3.40856)

1.12118***(3.99142)

-0.34262**(-2.17628)

0.424676

1996

0.14880***(3.40450)

0.99551***(5.15642)

-0.27649**(-2.17636)

0.507915

1997

0.17312***(3.52664)

0.89649***(4.53426)

-0.13040 (-1.14917)

0.431648

1998

0.13678***(3.31782)

0.77235***(4.41765)

-0.09809 (-0.28284)

0.452057

1999

0.12527***(3.12786)

0.69758***(4.61436)

0.04182 (0.16902)

0.417774

2000

0.16717***(4.18409)

0.92626***(6.15059)

0.30184 (0.99480)

0.520145

2001

0.12702***(3.78763)

0.67454***(5.20378)

0.04703 (0.23939)

0.468927

Note: 1) Figures in the first and second columns are the scores of parameters’ coefficients. Those in
parentheses are scores of t-statistics.

2) *P<0.1, **P<0.05 and ***P<0.01

3) Figures on lower lines in 1984 and 1988 are t-statistics calculated from White hetero-skedasticity
consistent covariance.

4) Shaded figures showed different signs from the theoretically expected ones.



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