The name is absent



10

22,.%________

Mobil Com

1992

5,700

5,0

4th quarter
2002

Mr. &Mrs.
Schmidt 50%
France
Telecom
28.5%**

O2 (earlier
Viag
Intercom)

October
1998

3,900

^V

mid 2003

mmO2
(earlier British
Telecom)

Quam

Nov. 2001

^9∞

0.1***

Beginning
of2003

Telefonica
Moviles57.2%
Sonera 42.8%

* At the end of 2001, because Mobilcom and Quam do not own their own networks,
their customers are included in the number of the other suppliers.

** The structure of owners will change and therefore also the UMTS-timetable.
***Mid of April 2002

Source: Die Zeit nr. 21, 16th of May 2002, page 23; authors translation

In my Brno paper I wrote:

“Overpricing and overspeculation

In my view nobody is able to demonstrate seriously that such prices ( which have
been paid for company mergers on the mobile phone market) will make it possible to
earn money in the future, even if it is recognised that they partly financed the
takeovers with their own money, namely their shares. One reason is that the prices
for phoning have become very low, that the products of telecommunication services
are very homogenous and that in such markets even an oligopolistic market structure
does not guarantee over-proportional profits. The share rate-profit ratio (Kurs-
Gewinn-Verhaltnis (KGV)) has become extremely high in the “new economy”.
Satiated markets will be seen even in the mobile telephone market in the next two or
three years, although the next generation of mobile telephones based on the UMTS-
standard will expand the turnover of this sector - but in a very unknown dimension -
whereas the costs of obtaining a licence and investing in the new infrastructure are
extremely high. But if you ignore these basic issues and only follow the internal logic
of the game of a stock exchange boom in combination with a classical founder´s
boom..., you may also find some of the present arguments for playing this game.

The logic of the process of centralising this market requires the bosses of these firms
to make their own corporations valuable (schwer) in terms of total stock market
prices..The share rate-profit ratio of Mannesmann was 347.99 on 23rd December
1999 in comparison to about 11 for Volkswagen and other classical blue chips! One
explanation is that in
exploding new markets not turnovers and profits determine the
exchange rates but the
EBITDA, the Earnings Before Interests, Taxes,
Deterioration and (Goodwill-) Amortisation
. Indeed this key figure has risen
dramatically in the last years.
Corporate daring is rewarded and is reflected in
this indicator
(Honoriert wird dann unternehmerisches “Draufgangertum”). But at
the end of the day the share rate - profit ratio will again dominate the share pricing at
the stock exchanges. And no one can be really sure whether corporations like
Vodafone (or Deutsche Telekom, France Telecom etc.) will be able to earn money in
the future, because they have high debts (see below) which have been accumulated in
the last year and will increase by 2001” (Bomer, 2000a, 10f)



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