than bonding ties. Thus, the problem of building bridging ties involves difficulties inherent in
collective action in any large group situation. These difficulties, as well as their solution are
defined in Mancur Olson's description of the public goods problem.
In the Logic of Collective Action,19 Olson points out that there is fundamental difference
in the way in which collective action is obtained in large versus small groups. In a small group,
which is the locus of most bonding social capital, contributions to collective action is achieved
through inter-personal rewards and punishments. In large groups, the locus of bridging social
capital, the enforcement of individual contributions to collective efforts is more difficult. This is
a result of two conditions found in large groups that are not found in small groups; the large size
of the group limits the effectiveness of inter-personal rewards and punishments and a single
individual's contributions to group efforts is much less significant. Both of these points mean
that, ceteris paribus, the single individual is less motivated to contribute to collective action in
the large group than in the small one. In short, large groups face a "free rider problem."
The definition of the public goods problem helps us to identify the universal challenge
faced by all groups if they seek to develop bridging social capital. Size alone suggests that
creating bridging social capital should be more difficult than creating bonding social capital.
Olson's solutions to the public goods problem in large groups helps us identify the
limiting parameters that groups face when they attempt to find solutions to the public goods
dilemma. He points out that there are three basic solutions to the public goods problem in large
group situations: (1) a coercive mechanism; (2) selective incentives; and (3) a federal group
strategy. Each of these solutions offers different paths with which to develop bridging social
capital ties.