Unilateral Actions the Case of International Environmental Problems



^H = q(H,0)

(7.b)


And will, under the given assumptions, always exist:

Result 3: Given the single crossing condition, there always exists a separating
equilibrium given by (7.a) and (7.b). Proof, see appendix 2.

This result is reproduced in figure 4, where RiL and RiH are indicated by the dot-
ted lines as defines above. The interception indicated by the bold line indicates
the set of separating equilibrium outcomes, all representing an increase in re-
duction levels for the low cost compared to the full information situation.

Again, as in section 3, the requirement on belief formation will be that if a sig-
nal
q’ is weakly dominated for one type θ, but not for the other type, the unin-
formed players’ belief should place zero probability that
θ has sent q’, i.e. q’
must be followed by posterior ρ(θq,)=0. The result of doing this is stated be-
low:

Result 4: There exists one undominated separating equilibrium,

( qL, qH ) = ( qU, q ( H ,0)), where

qiUA =suparg{qi Qi | NBi(L,qi ,1)=NBi(L,q(L,1),0)}.

Proof, see appendix 2

28



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