Unilateral Actions the Case of International Environmental Problems

9. Literature

[1] Barrett, S.(1990), International Environmental Agreements as Games, in R.
Pethig, ed., Conflicts and Cooperation in Managing Environmental Re-
sources. Springer-Verlag, Berlin.

[2] Barrett, S. (1994), ‘Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agree-
ments’, Oxford Economic Papers, 46, 878-894.

[3] Barrett, S. (1998), ‘Political Economy of the Kyoto Protocol’, Oxford Re-
view of Economic Policy, 14, 4, 20-39.

[4] Becker, G (1983), ‘A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for
Political Influence’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 98, 371-400.

[5] Brandt, U.S. (2002), ‘Actions Prior to Entering an International Environ-
mental Agreement’, Journal of Institutional and Theoretic Economics,
158, 695-714.

[6] Dahl, G. B. and M. R. Ransom (1999), ‘Does Where You Stand Depend on
Where You Sit? Tithing Donations and Self-Serving Beliefs’, The Ameri-
can Economic Review, 89, 703-728.

[7] Dijkstra, B. R. (1999), the Political Economy of Environmental Policy,
Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, Cheltenham, U.K.

[8] Finus, M. (2001), Game Theory and International Environmental Coop-
eration, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, Cheltenham, U.K.

[9] Hoel, M. (1991), ‘Global Environmental Problems: The Effects of Unilat-
eral Actions Taken by One Country’, Journal of Environmental Economics
and Management, 20, 55-70.

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