menting the necessary measures, that is, by engaging in full-scale unilateral ac-
tions, can it possibly convince the other countries. But why is this an efficient
means of transmission.
Another reason to undertake unilateral actions is the expectation of achieving a
first mover advantage. The existence of such advantages clearly enhances the
prospect of unilateral actions. In particular, the way unilateral actions are mod-
elled in this paper, where it is assumed that a country actually undertaking the
necessary reduction measures, this country clearly has a first mover advantage.
In this case a country could reveal that costs are low, trigger higher reductions
in other countries and at the same time increase the potential of the first mover
advantages by enabling large-scale export possibilities. A country that engages
in unilateral actions could also make its move more profitable by engaging in
activities that yield first mover advantages. For example, in Denmark national
subsidies of the windmill industry could turn out to be extremely profitable if a
significant reduction of CO2 emissions is initiated globally.
It has been argued that the emergence of substitute substances for CFC gasses
changed certain EU countries’ strategies in the run-up to the Montreal protocol,
from being reluctant participants to taking the lead. If we include first mover
advantages, the conclusion about the curse of the initiator of unilateral actions
might no longer be valid. The reason is that if first mover advantages vary (or
are highly distinct) for the countries, then even if a country does not have high
expectations (compared to some average for the countries) it might still initiate
unilateral actions that also ex post turn out to be profitable.
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