Firm Creation, Firm Evolution and Clusters in Chile’s Dynamic Wine Sector: Evidence from the Colchagua and Casablanca Regions

21

“In a vineyard people don’t do that [sell immediately when without profit], they
say no this is a long term investment. We will wait but after so many years
without profit you have to stop and sell it” (pg 5, 2008).

Another reason for the predicted fall in companies was given to problems of the exchange
rate. Serrano (2008), from Montes, suggests that wineries that cannot increase their
efficiency and or prices will have to sell up.

The consolidation of distribution channels meaning small and medium players cannot
access the market and fail in the face of competition (Arnold et al, 2002). In the U.S the
number of wholesalers has shrunk by 73% and one third of all wine there is sold through
just 5 wholesalers. A similar trend is seen in the U.K. where the dominant distributors are
the supermarkets with 60% of wine volume and Norway where 100% of wine is sold
through the two leading distributors (Sanchez, 2004).

An effect of this decrease in wine firms will be the consolidation of bigger wineries as
Phelps (2008) explains San Pedro winery is taking over the two companies of Leyda and
Tabali, and Eguiguren (2008) gives the example of Concha y Toro, Chile’s biggest wine
firm, taking over the Francisco winery in the North. This is surely not a positive
prediction considering 40% of exports (in value) are already under the control of three
big Chilean firms; Concha y Toro, San Pedro y Santa Rita (Arnold et al, 2002).

One could predict that as Casablanca is still increasing grapes under vine, there has been
a rise from 2500 hectares of land under wine grapes in 1998 to 4115 hectares in 2006
(Wines of Chile, 2008), and because of several interviewees from the Colchagua valley

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