provided by Research Papers in Economics
AGRICULTURAL TRADE IN THE URUGUAY
ROUND: INTO FINAL BATTLE
C. Ford Runge
University of Minnesota
I hope that I shall not be asked by the House to give any definite
account of such measures as we are able to take. If I were to set
them high, I might raise false hopes; if I set them low, I might
cause undue despondency and alarm; if I stated exactly what
they were, that would be exactly what the enemy would like to
know (Churchill).
“Trade is war.” So bluntly stated an Australian agricultural econo-
mist after returning from a stint at the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) in Paris (Young). Commer-
cial policy has always been a form of strategic weapon. Thomas
Jefferson, discussing relations with the Indian tribes in 1808, re-
marked that “Commerce is the great engine by which we are to co-
erce them, and not war.”
A primary difference between the pre- and post-nuclear age is the
reduced appeal of force as a means of achieving economic advan-
tage. Because modern tactical weapons make armed engagements
riskier and more expensive, Jefferson’s dictum has new appeal: the
imperial ambitions of nations are pursued through economic trade
policy. What could be accomplished in the 1930s and 40s by lethal
force is now pursued through economic expansionism.
The Call to Battle
Trade strategy is thus defined, like warfare, primarily by national
interest and involves threat, counter-threat, subterfuge and retalia-
tion. While the rhetoric of trade may lay claim to higher principles,
such as “free trade,” “self-sufficiency,” or “fair trade,” thinking of
these principles as calls to battle, rather than real objectives, gives a
more accurate impression of trade diplomacy. This paper will adopt
such a perspective (Runge, 1988).
Churchill’s difficulty in making full and accurate statements about
strategic interests to the House of Commons carries over into the
problems of U.S. negotiators’ relations with Congress. If announced
public aims are set too high or too low for the Uruguay Round of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), false hopes or
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