IMMIGRATION AND AGRICULTURAL LABOR POLICIES



staffed at a level of one million would require every male in the U.S.
to serve at some time during every year!)

Other agricultural employers have demonstrated the ability to re-
tain almost all their workers through the growing season. Some get
70 percent of their workers to return the following season. These em-
ployers have adopted systematic recruiting and hiring procedures and
have investigated causes of worker dissatisfaction and eliminated them.

Productivity — Some agricultural employers show little interest in
productivity since their piece rate costs are the same no matter how
fast or slow the workers are. Yet productivity differences can mean
big differences in worker income and big differences in the attractive-
ness of the job. In the same crew, there can be unusually great differ-
ences in productivity. This situation offers concerned employers the
opportunity to examine productivity differences and institute job rede-
sign and training to enhance productivity among the less productive.

Productivity also varies considerably from farm to farm due to man-
agement practices. For example, some managers are able to keep
downtimes to a minimum, while the workforces on other farms always
seem to face stoppages in the flow of work, a cost workers often are
forced to bear at their own expense. Firms with higher productivity
require fewer workers.

Absenteeism — Some agricultural employers accept massive worker
absenteeism as a fact of life and simply overstaff their crews by as
much as 25 percent to adjust to it. Such overstaffing is often unnec-
essary and creates inefficiencies in labor management practices.

Other agricultural employers have been able to discern causes of
employee absenteeism and to install practices and programs to keep
it to a minimal level. For example some employers who formerly ex-
perienced absentee rates in excess of 20 percent have been able to
reduce the rate to less than 5 percent. Firms with lower rates of ab-
senteeism require fewer workers.

Compensation — The conventional image of farmworker pay is the
minimum wage with no fringe benefits; yet some agricultural employ-
ers have been able to pay considerably more. For example, lettuce
harvesters in the Salinas area earn in the neighborhood of $10 to $12
per hour and often average $20,000 per year plus a full range of fringe
benefits.

Upgrading Opportunities — In some firms, almost all the supervi-
sory staff and all the better paid equipment operators are hired di-
rectly whereas the harvesters have little prospect for advancement.
This situation can be a source of tension within the workforce.

Other agricultural employers have been able to implement meas-
ures to select, train and promote the better workers within their har-
vest labor force. For example, in some firms, all employees including
supervisory staff and computer programmers, are former harvesters.

152



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