Auction Design without Commitment



Finally, our model provides also some insights into the literature on optimal
auctions under efficiency (e.g. Ausubel and Cramton 1999; Krishna and Perry,
1998). The efficiency restriction is usually motivated vaguely by appealing to
”Coasian dynamics”, which leads to efficient allocation of resources through the
seller’s commitment inability, or resale markets.25 This paper is explicit on how
efficiency emerges as a consequence of sequentially rational redesigns of auction
mechanisms.

25 Zheng (2002) is an exception. He characterizes outcome functions that can be implemented
with explicit resale markets. See also Haile (2000) for a formal modelling of retrading.

17



More intriguing information

1. A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF ALTERNATIVE ECONOMETRIC PACKAGES: AN APPLICATION TO ITALIAN DEPOSIT INTEREST RATES
2. Errors in recorded security prices and the turn-of-the year effect
3. EXPANDING HIGHER EDUCATION IN THE U.K: FROM ‘SYSTEM SLOWDOWN’ TO ‘SYSTEM ACCELERATION’
4. FUTURE TRADE RESEARCH AREAS THAT MATTER TO DEVELOPING COUNTRY POLICYMAKERS
5. The name is absent
6. KNOWLEDGE EVOLUTION
7. The name is absent
8. Gender and headship in the twenty-first century
9. The name is absent
10. GOVERNANÇA E MECANISMOS DE CONTROLE SOCIAL EM REDES ORGANIZACIONAIS
11. The name is absent
12. National urban policy responses in the European Union: Towards a European urban policy?
13. The name is absent
14. The name is absent
15. The name is absent
16. TOMOGRAPHIC IMAGE RECONSTRUCTION OF FAN-BEAM PROJECTIONS WITH EQUIDISTANT DETECTORS USING PARTIALLY CONNECTED NEURAL NETWORKS
17. The voluntary welfare associations in Germany: An overview
18. Stakeholder Activism, Managerial Entrenchment, and the Congruence of Interests between Shareholders and Stakeholders
19. The English Examining Boards: Their route from independence to government outsourcing agencies
20. The name is absent