Finally, our model provides also some insights into the literature on optimal
auctions under efficiency (e.g. Ausubel and Cramton 1999; Krishna and Perry,
1998). The efficiency restriction is usually motivated vaguely by appealing to
”Coasian dynamics”, which leads to efficient allocation of resources through the
seller’s commitment inability, or resale markets.25 This paper is explicit on how
efficiency emerges as a consequence of sequentially rational redesigns of auction
mechanisms.
25 Zheng (2002) is an exception. He characterizes outcome functions that can be implemented
with explicit resale markets. See also Haile (2000) for a formal modelling of retrading.
17
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