Auction Design without Commitment



concludes with discussion.

2Setup

There is a seller of a single indivisible good and a set N = {1, ..., n} of buyers.
Seller’s publicly known valuation of the good is
0.Buyeri’s privately known
valuation
θi is drawn from a discrete set Θi R+.10 Write Θ = ×iN Θi with
a typical element
θ = (θi)iN , and Θ-i = ×j6=iΘi with a typical element θ-i =
(
θj)j6=i. 11 Denote by ∆(Θ) the set of probability distributions p over Θ, and by
pi the ith marginal distribution of p.

The set of allocations of the good is A = {(a1, ..., an) {0, 1}n : a1 + ... + an
1}
, where ai =1if the good is allocated to i and ai = 0 otherwise. Write
a = (a1, ..., an). A money transfer from buyer i to the seller is denoted by mi R+
and m = (m1, ..., mn) is a profile of transfers. The set of all outcomes x =(a, m)
is then X = A × Rn+ .

Now we define a mechanism. A mechanism does two things: processes infor-
mation and implements an outcome. We separate these tasks. A mechanism is
a composite function
φ = g h, consisting of an information processing device h
and an implementation device g such that

h : Θ → ∆(S) and g : S X,

where ∆(S) is the set of probability distributions over S, an open subset of an
Euclidean space
. That is, the information processing device h generates, after
receiving the buyers’ messages, a public signal
s S. The signal s is the only
information anyone - including the seller - obtains from
h. The outcome function
g then implements an outcome x X conditional on the realized signal s.

Thus the mechanism φ = g h is a composite function

g h : Θ → ∆(X),

where ∆(X) is the set of probability distributions over X. Letting H = {h : Θ →
∆(
S)} and G = {g : S X} denote the sets of information processing devices
and implementation devices, respectively, the set of all composite mechanisms is

Φ = {g h : Θ → ∆(X) such that g G and h H}.

The support of distribution p is denoted by supp(p). Also write h(θ) = {s :
h(s : θ) 0} and h(supp(p)) = {s : h(s : θ) 0 and θ supp(p)}. Given p,a
signal
s h(supp(p)) of the information processing device h induces a posterior

p(θ : s, h)=


p(θ)h (s : θ)
PθΘp(θ)h (s : θ).


(1)


10 Hence countable and without accumulation points. This assumption is for expositional
simplicity.

11That is, pii) = Pθ-i p(θi, θ-i).



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