high as the national average, i.e., isb ≥ 1, employers were less likely to be
restrictive than the rest. In sectors where isb was low, employers were more
likely to be restrictive than the rest. One possible explanation for the latter
is that immigration can make them less competitive in the output market
than those employers who could benefit from cheap labor. Therefore, this
Luxembourg case is consistent with our expectation.
In Spain and the UK, however, we find the marginal effect of employ × isb
significantly positive. For Spain, its size relative to the significantly nega-
tive effect of employ implies that, as far as the employability of immigrant
labor does not exceed the national average, employers remain supportive of
immigration than the rest. This might suggest that isb is not a measure of
the sectoral employability of immigrants. A low value of isb might be for
instance just a consequence of restrictive immigration policy in place at the
time. If so, a low value of isb in a sector might be a sign of labor shortage
in that sector, and the employers may desire increased immigration.
The effect of employ is significantly negative in Austria and positive in
Finland and Sweden. It does not seem to depend on isb in these countries.
Also note that neither employ nor employ × isb is an important determinant
at the Union level.
Turning to the status of being unemployed, the estimated marginal effect
of unemploy × isb is significantly positive in Italy and Luxembourg. In both
countries, the effect of unemploy is significantly negative. Therefore, the
status of being unemployed increases the probability of preferring immigra-
tion restriction if the sectoral employability of immigrant labor is sufficiently
high: isb ≥ .6 for Italy and isb ≥ .4 for Luxembourg.
20