just because of externally imposed stipulations but because to behave in morally
acceptable ways is part of what it means to practice professionally. This suggests that
patients are well served if nurses are encouraged to develop those virtues appropriate to
the ethical practice of nursing. If this is correct then one legitimate part of the role of the
nurse teacher is that she or he should strive to inculcate the virtues of nursing in nursing
students.
The nature of virtue
For the purposes of this work I am accepting a largely Aristotelian account in which the
existence of something approximating an enduring character is accepted. On this
account a virtue is understood as a general disposition the possession of which leads a
person to act, from inclination, in ways consistent with that virtue. This is to say that a
person’s character is illustrated by the exercise of the virtues. Thus, as Hursthouse
(1997) characterises it, a just person acts in ways that are just rather than unjust, a
courageous person acts in a courageous way and so on. A virtue may be primarily a
moral or an intellectual disposition, although some virtues may not be easily categorised
using this particular binary distinction, and the virtue that provides the possibility of
unity of the virtues is phronesis (practical wisdom). Because this account is no more
than a brief outline it leaves much unsaid and thus offers much for which it might be
criticised. It implies, amongst other things, that a virtuous person is someone who has
perfection of character but this suggestion is not intended, for in the account is an
allegiance to Aristotle’s’ doctrine of the mean. Aristotle recognised that in order to
become virtuous one must aim to act in the right way, in relation to the right person, at
the right time and for the right reason. This requires aiming at the mean (but not a
mathematical mean) in respect of any given disposition and in relation to the
circumstances in which expression of that particular virtue is necessary or desirable.
Thus the virtuous act is an act in the right measure (at the mean) and not an act that
reflects either a deficiency or an excess (both of which are corresponding vices). As
such, courage is a mean between the extremes of rashness or foolhardiness at one end
and of cowardice at the other. Thus while a person may be generally disposed to act in a
courageous way, the acts of a courageous person will be different under different
circumstances because different virtuous actions are called for by those different
circumstances. Moreover, it is not supposed that a virtuous person will hit the mean at
every attempt as the fallibility of individuals is accepted. Hence, in at least this one
sense, virtue is aspirational. At worst, full virtue may not be achievable, but this does
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