upon which we rely to protect us from the sorts of harms that lie beyond our immediate
control.
I have noted here that there are different sorts of risks of harm to which we are
vulnerable. In terms of our ability to act so as to reduce our vulnerability it is possible to
distinguish three different types of risks of harm.
Type 1 risks of harm
Those risks of harm against which an individual has the opportunity to take actions that
have a reasonable chance of providing some protection. So walking on the pavement
normally reduces the risk of harm to individual pedestrians from road traffic.
Type 2 risks of harm
Those risks of harm against which an individual must rely for protection (such as is
available) on the actions of others. This may be a reliance on individual others or on
some form of institutionalised others. So the pedestrian is protected by the individual
other in the form of the driver who drives with sufficient care and attention, as well as
the institutionalised others in the form of various social or political institutions that have
been developed for the purpose. Thus in the UK the risks of harm associated with motor
vehicle use are reduced by institutionalised regulations. The highway code, road
markings, traffic signs, MOT testing, seat belt laws, and so on, all serve to reduce the
general likelihood of harm.
Type 3 risks of harm
Those risks of harm against which an individual is, generally speaking, powerless to
protect her or himself regardless of the actions of others. Harms that occur as a result of
unexpected or unanticipated events (what insurance companies tend to describe as 'acts
of God') which allow only limited scope for effective action would fit this category. The
earthquake that destroys a road causing damage to cars and injury to occupants is the
sort of event to which we are vulnerable but against which we are, generally speaking,
defenceless.
While this categorisation imposes an artificial order it does serve two purposes at this
point. The first purpose is to offer a counter to any Stoic tendency toward fatalism. It
allows this by providing a guide by which we might determine whether an action we
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