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have the concerns that lead to the controls, the controls identify further
problems that lead to further tightening of controls.
(QCAl 2000)
I see this statement as key evidence of the effects of the ‘accountability agenda’ I
identified at the end of the preceding chapter as the hidden driver of change resulting
from the decay in trust. A similarly significant remark emerged in an interview with a
DfEE official who, when asked to comment on the importance of comparability
between Boards, perhaps inadvertently made a specific link between accountability
and the tightening of regulation:
I would say comparability is a very important issue for us. And every year that
there ,s any suggestion in the press that things aren ,t comparable causes us to
intervene a great deal. Very important. (DfES 2000)
It followed therefore that each of the changes to the regulatory structure involved a
shift of some degree of control from the Boards to the central body. The inherent
conflict in the English structure was pinpointed by Kathryn Ecclestone in her 2003
analysis of the iiPrinciples, politics and practice" of post-16 assessment and
qualifications:
Awarding bodies...have vested commercial interests in maintaining their
presence in the education and training system. For governments intent on
standardising assessment systems in order to make them more transparent and
accountable, diverse and independent awarding bodies are barriers to central
regulation. (Ecclestone 2003: 74)
While I acknowledge the Boards’ vested interest in remaining as key players in the
system, I contend that their assessment expertise has contributed to the checks and
balances essential in retaining public confidence in such high-stakes qualifications.
Oddly, while the Boards were of course aware of the increasing central control, its
gradual encroachment on their independence did not arouse any overt resistance on
their part. Their defence of their vested interest was minimal.