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“changing relationships mediated through structural and institutional realignments'”
have certainly involved shifts in power “between ‘old’ professionals and
administrators and ‘new’ managerial roles” (Clarke 1997: xiii) at the centre.
Their concept of the “managerial state” is congruent with Anthony Sampson’s meta-
analysis of the changed role of members of parliament who formulate the policies
which drive that state. Returning forty years after writing his Anatomy of Britain to
discover whether and how power had altered, Sampson documents a major shift from
amateurism: “Forty years ago most members [of parliament] saw [politics] as only
part of their activity” - to professionalism: “In the twenty-first century nearly all MPs
are full-time politicians who have left their previous jobs” (Sampson 2004:8, 10). It
follows that professional politicians are predisposed to be highly involved in the detail
of policy-making, quite the reverse of their Victorian predecessors who abhorred
direct involvement. Sampson’s argument is that their closed existence within the
‘Westminster Village’ keeps them less aware of the views of ordinary electors than
they once were. I propose that another result of their full personal investment in a
political career is that politicians are now more than ever keen to make a clear
difference in whatever field they hold office. Change is therefore accelerated, as time
is more than ever of the essence. The change imposed on the examining boards
provide a classic example of how political influence on such change can have
unintended consequences. In their case, I contend that increasing regulation which
weakened their professional autonomy led to a crisis in September 2002.
With this theoretical position framing my research, I turn to the methodological
structure which will attempt to answer my research questions and support my thesis.