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describe the various groups or individuals who influence English educational policy.
In attempting to be more specific, Stephen Ball’s concept of what he terms “the
educational state” is helpful: “the conglomeration of sites and agencies concerned
with the regulation of the education system” which “contain and represent contesting
interests in policy formation and policy debate” (Ball 1990: 20). This definition
enables an examination of strands of influence which can be more precise than the
currently popular, but undefined, term ‘policy makers’. In fact, Ball specifically
includes examining boards as one of the agencies which form a part of the educational
state: “some system regulation and system management in education are actually
carried out by quangos, appointed bodies, intermediary agencies and even, in the
case of examinations, by quasi-commercial organisations” (Ball 1990: 20). This
thesis will challenge Ball’s implication that the boards are agencies which regulate the
system: in fact quite the reverse. They are now recipients of regulation rather than
actors in its formation despite their undoubted role within the “educational state”.
I have found that the most apt conceptual framework for the power shift from
agencies within the “education state” to central control is Clarke and Newman’s
notion of “the managerial state”. (Clarke and Newman 1997) Their purpose is to
explore:
...a range of structural and institutional realignments: the
introduction of markets, the rise of contracting, the changing
balance of power between central government and local and
regional agencies of governance....
(Clarke 1997: ix)
While Clarke and Newman are concerned principally with changes in policy which
affect the welfare state and in particular the National Health Service, I believe their
approach is equally appropriate for considering the series of changes to the
relationship between central agencies and the examining boards. In their case, the