The name is absent



320


THE COMMON COUNCIL


sufficient jurats or ex-jurats from whom the sitting mayor and
the twenty-four jurats chose one for the next mayor ; the
burgesses elected two non-jurats as chamberlains, the other
two being appointed, with the same restriction, by the mayor
and twenty-four. The life tenure of the jurats was left
untouched, but vacancies by death, etc., were to be filled
by the burgesses nominating two sufficient persons from whom
the surviving jurats should choose one or demand a fresh,
nomination, if both were considered unsuitable.1 The dissen-
sions, however, continued, and probably owing to the un-
ordered constitution of the borough assembly, the
potentiores
succeeded in 1416 in getting the new system revoked and ob-
tained royal approval of the step.2 Elections were again
conducted by committees appointed in the old way, the bur-
gesses at large having no voice in this matter and no organized
or regular voice in any other. Naturally dissatisfaction broke
out once more, until at last in 1420-21 the episcopal lord of
the town negotiated an agreement which gave the town a
common council on the same representative basis as those of
London and Norwich, but proportionally smaller. Each of
the nine constabularies of Lynn was to elect yearly three of the
more competent and peaceful of its burgesses to take part “in
the causes and affairs touching the town ” which, as carefully
defined in the document, are purely financial. Whatever the
mayor, the twenty-four, and the twenty-seven (or the majority
of these in each case) ordained in these matters was to hold
good.3 Lynn therefore withheld from its common councillors
that share in the election of municipal officers and burgesses
for parliament which was enjoyed by the corresponding bodies
at London and Norwich. The name common council was from
the first applied, as in many other boroughs, to the whole
body of which they formed a part, as well as more particularly
to themselves as representing the commonalty. Owing to
the existence of a privileged non-burgess element at Lynn,
however, the common councillors did not here entirely re-
place the commonalty. Down to 1524 the assembly remained
the
Congregalio Communitatis. Few but councillors normally

ɪ Hist. MSS. Comm., Rept. XI, u.s., pp. 196 ft. The date is uncertain
but it was Henry V whose intervention brought about the settlement
(ibid., p. 197 : '' our present dread lord.”)

2 Ibid., pp. 202-3 1 c∕∙ 16o, 169. Mrs. Green's narrative of the events
of 1411-16 has several erroneous dates and some confusions
(Town Life,
ii. 411 ft.). For example, she places Henry V’s intervention after, instead
of before, the new election ordinances
(ibid., p. 414).

3 Hist. MSS. Comm., Rept. XI, u.s., pp. 245-6.

LYNN

321


attended it, but an instance is recorded—in 1463—when six
from the commonalty were appointed in addition to six from
each of the two councils to assess a tax,1 and the election of
burgesses for parliament took place in the presence of the
commonalty.2 It must be added that the popular basis of
the common council was not very broad, even for the burgesses.
Under Henry VI the constabulary actually electing seldom
numbered more than twenty voters, and sometimes as few as
twelve.3 Such as it was, this popular element in the Lynn
council, together with the assembly, was swept away by the
charter of 1524, which made Lynn one of the closest of close
boroughs. The government of the town and the admission
of burgesses were placed in the hands of a mayor, twelve
aidermen, and eighteen common councillors. The councillors
were to be chosen by the mayor and aidermen from the bur-
gesses at large whenever they pleased, with power to remove
any and to fill vacancies. The aidermen, who were to hold
office for life, were chosen by the Crown in the first instance ;
vacancies to be filled by the common councillors, who were
also to elect an aiderman as mayor annually.4 Thus every
vestige of popular participation in the town administration
disappeared. The aidermen and the common councillors
were so interlocked in this close oligarchy that they came to
be described as one “ house ” or “ company,” and down to
1835 the only breach that was effected in their monopoly of
power was during the Commonwealth, when the commons
demanded and obtained the right to elect their representatives
in parliament, which was more than they had possessed in ⅛e
middle ages.5 For the complete failure of “ democracy υ' at
Lynn, the early loss of all share in the choice of the borough
officers and council of twenty-four may have been largely
accountable, and the decline of her medieval prosperity no
doubt riveted the chains upon her.

З.

The addition of a “ common council ” to an older council,
which we have traced at London, Norwich, and Lynn, became

1 Hist. MSS. Comnt., Rept. XI, u.s., p. 168.

s Ibid., p. 169.               3 Ibid., p. 162.               4 Ibid., p. 206.

6 Ibid., pp. 149 ff. Since 1524 the representatives had been elected by
the town council directly, not through a committee
(ibid., p. 148).



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