do not change their nature by losing their responsibility. The arbitrary acts which are
unpunished are not the less vicious, though none but God, the conscience, and the opinions
of mankind take cognizance of them.
It is not merely so in this or that government, but in all countries. The king in this country is
undoubtedly unaccountable for his actions. The House of Lords, if it should ever exercise,
(God forbid I should suspect it would ever do what it has never done!)—but if it should
ever abuse its judicial power, and give such a judgment as it ought not to give, whether
from fear of popular clamor on the one hand, or predilection to the prisoner on the other,—
if they abuse their judgments, there is no calling them to an account for it. And so, if the
Commons should abuse their power, nay, if they should have been so greatly delinquent as
not to have prosecuted this offender, they could not be accountable for it; there is no
punishing them for their acts, because we exercise a part of the supreme power. But are
they less criminal, less rebellious against the Divine Majesty? are they less hateful to man,
whose opinions they ought to cultivate as far as they are just? No: till society fall into a
state of dissolution, they cannot be accountable for their acts. But it is from confounding the
unaccountable character inherent in the supreme power with arbitrary power, that all this
confusion of ideas has arisen.
Even upon a supposition that arbitrary power can exist anywhere, which we deny totally,
and which your Lordships will be the first and proudest to deny, still, absolute supreme
dominion was never conferred or delegated by you,—much less, arbitrary power, which
never did in any case, nor ever will in any case, time, or country, produce any one of the
ends of just government.
It is true that the supreme power in every constitution of government must be absolute, and