BEFORM OF THE COURTS OF JUSTICE, ETC.
them saw the disgraceful abuses, and were ashamed of them.
The venality of the courts was quite manifest, as we may see
from the speeches of Cicero. To take away the judicial power
from the senate, and to vest it in an independent body of men,
had therefore become the great problem. But no one was
desirous of restoring that great privilege to the équités, and
Rome found herself involved in difficulties, from which she was
unable to extricate herself. In such times, the classes of so-
ciety are distinguished from one another by their landed
property or their capital. If a person wants to generalise, he
cannot adopt any other principle, although it is thoroughly
false. This division, however, cannot be prevented under such
circumstances, and Rome was on that false road, on which
France is at the present day. There existed already a census
for the members of the senate : though it is uncertain whether
it was necessary for every senator to possess 800,000 sesterces,
or one million ; but the census senatorius must, at all events,
have been higher than the minimum of the census equestris.
Regulations respecting the census senatorius had probably exist-
ed as early as the Hannibalian war. The judicial law of
L. Aurelius Cotta ordained that a number of senators, équités,
and the tribuni aerarii, should be invested with the judicial
power. The tribuni aerarii were probably people of a lower
census than the équités, and chosen by the tribes to represent
that class of citizens who possessed smaller fortunes. These
three classes, probably furnishing the same number each, were
to form a very numerous jury. The particulars of this law
are, fortunately preserved in the Commentaries of Asconius
Pedianus upon Cicero.3 This reform was wise and salutary,
and although the judges were still bad enough, yet they were
infinitely better than the senators.
Another great change which Pompey made in his con-
sulship, and without the assistance of Crassus, was, that he
restored the power of the tribunes exactly to what it had been
previously to the reforms of Sulla4; so that only the augurs
had the right of interfering to prevent their bringing measures
before the people: thus, just as Sulla had narrowed the tribu-
nician power too much, Pompey now went too far in the
3 In Pison, p. 16; in Cornelian, p.67, 78, foil.; Pseud. Ascon, ad Cic. Divin.
Verr. p.103; compare SchoLBobiens. p.339;Livy, ⅛ZL97; Veil. Paterc.ii.32.
4 Livy, Ppιt. 97; Veil. Paterc. ii. 30; Appian, De Bell Civil, i. 121; Cicero,
De Legib. iii. 9, and 11, in Verrem, i. 15, foil.
THIRD AVAR AGAINST MITHRIDATES.
opposite direction. It is the besetting sin of all men of medi-
ocrity, and of every-day politicians, to abolish restrictions
entirely, which appear to them, or really are, injurious. In
all such cases, moderation is the most important requisite ; but
shallow politicians never see any difficulty in settling a question
under such circumstances ; and their argument is simply this :—
“ Here we see a wrong, and we will tear it up by the root.”
The restoration of the tribuneship in the seventh century was
a monstrous absurdity; but Rome’s condition was such that an
angel from heaven would not have been able to bring about
any essential improvement. These things happened during
ey’s consulship, in the year 682. I shall relate the fur-
ther changes down to Cicero’s consulship (689), when I have
reached that period.
The third war against Mithridates broke out almost imme-
diately after the death of Nicomedcs.3 Various provocations
on the part of the Romans had preceded it ; but the immediate
cause was the treaty of the king of Pontus with Sertorius.
Mithridates was perfectly prepared, at least as far as his riches
and great exertions enabled him to be so; but the mere fact of
his being an Asiatic rendered his fall unavoidable. IIe is much
overrated in history, and too much honour has been paid to
him ; for all he did was of such a nature that it might have
been done by any one who possessed large sums of money and
numerous armies. As a general, he was wretched, and not
able to conduct either a campaign or a battle. Ele overran
Paphlagonia, and advanced into Bithynia and Cappadocia, and
having proceeded as far as Chalccdon on the Bosporus, ho
compelled the consul M. Aurelius Cotta to throw himself into
Chalccdon. His fleet also was successful, and chased that of
the Romans into the harbour, where he captured all their
ships of war. The Romans had now (678) been keeping
the soldiers of Valerius Flaccus (the Valcriani6) in those
regions for nearly thirteen years: they had become quite
savage, and were in the highest degree indignant at their
long banishment from home. After taking Heraclea and
Chalcedon, Mithridates therefore appeared before Cyzicus, a
most populous and wealthy town, which remained faithful to
5 Appian, De Dell. Mithrid. 71.
6 Dion Cass, xxxv, 14; Sallust, Hist, fragm. lib. v. Compare Lecture Ixxxvi.
p. 379, note 15.