The name is absent

Figure 7 and Table 5 provide evidence for Result 9. Figure 7 is based on the marginal
effects estimated using regressions in Table 5.¹⁷ In addition to what has already been
explained above in relation to Figure 5, the cooperation choices for anonymous public
monitoring includes additional six strategy regressors to trace global strategies (Table 5).
The representative subject that experienced a defection displayed a strong and persistent
decrease in future cooperation levels (solid line in Figure 7). Conversely, when the
representative subject observed a defection outside the match but did not experience it,
the response was much weaker (dashed line in Figure 7).¹⁸

Result 10 (strategy employed). Subjects preferred targeted strategies over reactive and
global strategies. In the non-anonymous public monitoring treatment, a defection by an
opponent generated a strong response in future encounters with the same opponent,
while defections outside the match were ignored.

In non-anonymous public monitoring subjects observed all individual histories.
Hence targeted, reactive and global strategies were all available. Recall that a subject
using a targeted strategy punished only opponents who had defected in previous
encounters but cooperated with everyone else, even if they had defected in the past with
someone else.

¹⁷ The graph uses the coefficient estimates coding reactive and global strategies, respectively. See footnote
for Figure 5. Marginal effects for the reactive strategies were computed for the average values of global
strategies regressors. Marginal effects for the global strategies were computed for the average values of
reactive strategies regressors.

¹⁸ The two lines in Figure 7 overlap for periods “any more than 5” because of how reactive and global
strategy regressors are defined (see Figure 1).

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