D*
∫MBl (∙) dD - μ1 = 0.
(23)
0
Note that landings are determined without regard to the effects of the extra mortality on the
future stock. Anglers either reach a satiation point in their consumptive use or are limited in
their landings by the quantity of harvest. Therefore, the incentive to discard is excessive in a
purely competitive system compared to the optimal situation in (12). The only exception occurs
when there is full mortality of discards. In this case, all harvest is lost to the system regardless of
whether it is retained and so landings decisions have no dynamic impact.23
The number of passengers per vessel and the factors of production are chosen by vessel
owners and are driven to equilibrium values through competition in the market for fishing trips.
We make no attempt to rigorously characterize the dynamic process by which such an
equilibrium is achieved, choosing instead to focus on the properties of the equilibrium itself.24
Given that angler density influences angler perceptions of quality, vessel owners will
seek to differentiate their services by altering the concentration of anglers on their vessel. Of
course, we would expect this vessel’s competitors to respond in kind, leading to an iterative
process of quality competition. The competitive market equilibrium arising as the limit of this
D * DMAX
process is implicitly defined by the following condition (again realizing that №^Т = n
ifμ2 > 0):
23 This finding that atomistic discard decisions may be socially optimal parallels the findings of Arnason (1994) in
the commercial case.
24 A fully developed dynamic explanation of the path to equilibrium would likely entail the consideration of the
adjustment costs of investment in fixed factors and partial irreversibility of such investments (c.f. Clark, et al. (1979)
and Gould (1968)).
18