D∙Γ 1
D*
NV N 2
(24)
∫]MBHHqfll, + MBsSn]dD - Nv (rFN,ZFN)- (W'v'z,.)
0 _
+ μiHqfl-N + μ2 [DNAX- j = 0.
In the case where landings are unconstrained, this condition says that quality competition will
drive angler density down to the point where the foregone increases in angler benefits and
reduced N-variable fixed costs from a reduction in density are just offset by the marginal costs of
doing so, where these extra costs are incurred through an increase in the number of trips
necessary to serve the available demand. In the event that landings are constrained by harvest,
then a full accounting of the exploitable marginal benefits (i.e. the full marginal willingness to
pay of anglers) of a decrease in density requires the third term in (24) to account for the value of
increased landings. A comparison of (24) to (13) reveals that the competitive equilibrium once
again fails to account for the dynamic implications of the choice variable. In this case a decrease
in N imparts a long-run cost due to its accelerating effect on per-angler mortality - the
implication being that the incentive in competitive equilibrium is toward a smaller number of
anglers per vessel than is optimal. This result is particularly telling given the prevailing wisdom
that open access competition encourages excessive congestion in commercial fisheries. This may
be true for inter-vessel congestion (an arguably small effect for many recreational fisheries), but
here congestion is assumed intra-vessel and consumer preferences for congestion avoidance are
relayed to vessel owners through market demand, driving this surprising result.25
25 Note that an extra cost of further lowering of N is revealed in (24) if the season limit constraint is binding on
vessels in competitive equilibrium. This cost arises due to fixed costs from the increased vessel capital needed to
service the surplus trip demand released by the lower angler density.
19