regulated steady state competitive market mimics the optimal solution) as long as the fees are set
as follows:
τL = λSS
τH-L = λSSφ
TNv = MB(NvNDmax,H(XSS,q(z,, N)∖L, S(z., N))♦ (NDmax )
(31)
-c(zq,zs,N,DMAX,w,r).
Note that the Q+3 implicit taxes directed at inputs, angler density, landings and angler days are
subsumed within two instruments on the level of discarded and retained catch. By targeting
discard mortality (and, by extension, harvest), a single properly calibrated instrument is able to
induce the optimal configuration of inputs. Furthermore, the combined fees on landings and
discards cause fishermen to face (either directly through taxes or permit fees or indirectly
through increased trip costs) the full dynamic cost of their fishing mortality when contemplating
whether to make a trip.
As noted previously, the magnitude of fishing induced mortality is critical. Fisheries
with either very high or low survivability rates of discards may be able to operate effectively
under a single fishing mortality instrument. This potential for policy simplification is especially
interesting given that survivability may itself be within the control of policymakers. For
instance, it may be possible to institute relatively low-cost and easily-monitored standards for the
handling and quick release of discards such that their mortality approaches zero. This would
allow fishing mortality to be controlled by a single dockside fee on landings and could also foster
considerable savings in monitoring, enforcement and administrative costs. This is especially
important given the likely difficulties in monitoring and enforcing instruments focused on
discards rather than those based on landings. Of course some deepwater fisheries will have
inherently high mortality rates so that the distinction between the appropriate discard and
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