Rent-Seeking in Noxious Weed Regulations: Evidence from US States



Table 3. Estimates of Cross-State Weed Regulatory Congruence, 2002

Slope Coefficients a

Sign of
Dissimilarity

List 1
NWS

List 2
NWS-Prohibited

List 3
NWS-Restricted

List 4

NW

I1. Average Temperature

Negative

6.0192*

77.9172**

-22.3952**

27.6193**

.

(3.0452)

.

(4.3315)

.

(3.3327)

.

(5.5819)

Positive

-97.3348**

-39.7359**

-86.9851**

-29.2558**

(4.5406)

(7.2631)

(4.9156)

(8.3285)

I2. Average Precipitation

Negative

10.7105**
(0.6691)

6.9771**

(0.8961)

5.4450**

(0.6867)

12.7726**
(1.0705)

Positive

-17.9395**

-18.6396**

-28.2771**

2.0383

(1.8217)

(2.6990)

(2.0377)

(3.1967)

I3. Variance of Temperature

Negative

0 0024

-0 0064*

0 0081*

-0 0162**

.

(0.0035)

.

(0.0037)

.

(0.0041)

.

(0.0060)

Positive

-6.5445**

-6.7927**

-6.3753**

-9.3485**

(1.5217)

(2.2661)

(1.6075)

(2.4415)

I4. Variance of Precipitation

Negative

0 0000

-0 0000

0 0001*

-0 0001

.

(0.0000)

.

(0.0000)

.

(0.0000)

.

(0.0000)

Positive

-5.6056**

-18.1827**

-4.0619*

-7.5137**

(1.4838)

(2.2530)

(1.5871)

(2.5831)

I5. Land Share Index

Negative

0.0280

0.0421

0.0071

-0.1023

(0.0234)

(0.0393)

(0.0218)

(0.0682)

Positive

0.0213

0.0377

0.0058

0.0230

(0.0281)

(0.0473)

(0.0263)

(0.0946)

I6. Water Share Index

Negative

0 2331

0 4933**

0 1009

0 0644

.

(0.1419)

.

(0.1867)

.

(0.1687)

.

(0.4540)

Positive

-0.1704

-0.6096*

-0.0178

0.0195

(0.1149)

(0.1544)

(0.1375)

(0.3803)

I7. Soil Share Index

Negative

-0 0481

-0 2558

0 0787

-0 5541

.

(0.1862)

.

(0.2809)

.

(0.2197)

.

(0.3862)

Positive

-0.0186

0.4315

-0.3601

0.1504

(0.1613)

(0.24151)

(0.1876)

(0.3390)

A1. Field Crop Land Share

Negative

4 6134**

8 9766**

4 3584**

5 9742**

.

(1.3560)

.

(1.9970)

.

(1.3247)

.

(1.7632)

Positive

-11.9382**

1.2836

-15.6365**

1.6604

(2.5060)

(3.7752)

(2.7747)

(3.9808)

A2. Irrigated Land Share

Negative

0 0254**

-0 0297

0 0577**

0 0135

.

(0.0098)

.

(0.0163)

.

(0.0117)

.

(0.0154)

Positive

-5.2458**

-3.3891

-1.2897

-4.6188*

(1.3962)

(2.0586)

(1.5069)

(2.3250)

ωc: Lobby of Consumer

Negative

-0.0626

0.0272

-0.0468

0.2804

.

(0.0324)

.

(0.0499)

.

(0.0362)

.

(0.1814)

Positive

-3.1981*

0.4738

-0.4750

-7.5734**

(1.5602)

(2.2480)

(1.7143)

(2.5308)

ωs: Lobby of Seed Industry

Negative

-0.0235

-0.0631**

0.0241

-0.0576**

.

(0.0158)

.

(0.0218)

.

(0.0178)

.

(0.0190)

Positive

-1.7488

-1.6051

1.8992

3.1139

(1.4492)

(2.1602)

(1.5447)

(2.3757)

ωm: Lobby of Commodity

Negative

0.4684**

0.2360

0.6222**

-0.7174**

Producer

(0.1139)

(0.1649)

(0.1260)

(0.2241)

Positive

-3.7354*

7.8416**

-3.4817*

-2.8600

(1.5426)

_________(2.3017)

_________(1.6396)

(2.5521)

** and * denote significance at the 1% and 5% level, respectively; number in parenthesis is standard error.

aI1 through I7 indicate ecological dissimilarity indexes, A1 and A2 are agronomic dissimilarity indexes, and ωk,
k=c,s,m, denote lobbying dissimilarity indexes.

29



More intriguing information

1. The Impact of Optimal Tariffs and Taxes on Agglomeration
2. Valuing Farm Financial Information
3. The name is absent
4. El impacto espacial de las economías de aglomeración y su efecto sobre la estructura urbana.El caso de la industria en Barcelona, 1986-1996
5. An Estimated DSGE Model of the Indian Economy.
6. The name is absent
7. The name is absent
8. Pricing American-style Derivatives under the Heston Model Dynamics: A Fast Fourier Transformation in the Geske–Johnson Scheme
9. Bridging Micro- and Macro-Analyses of the EU Sugar Program: Methods and Insights
10. LABOR POLICY AND THE OVER-ALL ECONOMY