Rent-Seeking in Noxious Weed Regulations: Evidence from US States



Table 3. Estimates of Cross-State Weed Regulatory Congruence, 2002

Slope Coefficients a

Sign of
Dissimilarity

List 1
NWS

List 2
NWS-Prohibited

List 3
NWS-Restricted

List 4

NW

I1. Average Temperature

Negative

6.0192*

77.9172**

-22.3952**

27.6193**

.

(3.0452)

.

(4.3315)

.

(3.3327)

.

(5.5819)

Positive

-97.3348**

-39.7359**

-86.9851**

-29.2558**

(4.5406)

(7.2631)

(4.9156)

(8.3285)

I2. Average Precipitation

Negative

10.7105**
(0.6691)

6.9771**

(0.8961)

5.4450**

(0.6867)

12.7726**
(1.0705)

Positive

-17.9395**

-18.6396**

-28.2771**

2.0383

(1.8217)

(2.6990)

(2.0377)

(3.1967)

I3. Variance of Temperature

Negative

0 0024

-0 0064*

0 0081*

-0 0162**

.

(0.0035)

.

(0.0037)

.

(0.0041)

.

(0.0060)

Positive

-6.5445**

-6.7927**

-6.3753**

-9.3485**

(1.5217)

(2.2661)

(1.6075)

(2.4415)

I4. Variance of Precipitation

Negative

0 0000

-0 0000

0 0001*

-0 0001

.

(0.0000)

.

(0.0000)

.

(0.0000)

.

(0.0000)

Positive

-5.6056**

-18.1827**

-4.0619*

-7.5137**

(1.4838)

(2.2530)

(1.5871)

(2.5831)

I5. Land Share Index

Negative

0.0280

0.0421

0.0071

-0.1023

(0.0234)

(0.0393)

(0.0218)

(0.0682)

Positive

0.0213

0.0377

0.0058

0.0230

(0.0281)

(0.0473)

(0.0263)

(0.0946)

I6. Water Share Index

Negative

0 2331

0 4933**

0 1009

0 0644

.

(0.1419)

.

(0.1867)

.

(0.1687)

.

(0.4540)

Positive

-0.1704

-0.6096*

-0.0178

0.0195

(0.1149)

(0.1544)

(0.1375)

(0.3803)

I7. Soil Share Index

Negative

-0 0481

-0 2558

0 0787

-0 5541

.

(0.1862)

.

(0.2809)

.

(0.2197)

.

(0.3862)

Positive

-0.0186

0.4315

-0.3601

0.1504

(0.1613)

(0.24151)

(0.1876)

(0.3390)

A1. Field Crop Land Share

Negative

4 6134**

8 9766**

4 3584**

5 9742**

.

(1.3560)

.

(1.9970)

.

(1.3247)

.

(1.7632)

Positive

-11.9382**

1.2836

-15.6365**

1.6604

(2.5060)

(3.7752)

(2.7747)

(3.9808)

A2. Irrigated Land Share

Negative

0 0254**

-0 0297

0 0577**

0 0135

.

(0.0098)

.

(0.0163)

.

(0.0117)

.

(0.0154)

Positive

-5.2458**

-3.3891

-1.2897

-4.6188*

(1.3962)

(2.0586)

(1.5069)

(2.3250)

ωc: Lobby of Consumer

Negative

-0.0626

0.0272

-0.0468

0.2804

.

(0.0324)

.

(0.0499)

.

(0.0362)

.

(0.1814)

Positive

-3.1981*

0.4738

-0.4750

-7.5734**

(1.5602)

(2.2480)

(1.7143)

(2.5308)

ωs: Lobby of Seed Industry

Negative

-0.0235

-0.0631**

0.0241

-0.0576**

.

(0.0158)

.

(0.0218)

.

(0.0178)

.

(0.0190)

Positive

-1.7488

-1.6051

1.8992

3.1139

(1.4492)

(2.1602)

(1.5447)

(2.3757)

ωm: Lobby of Commodity

Negative

0.4684**

0.2360

0.6222**

-0.7174**

Producer

(0.1139)

(0.1649)

(0.1260)

(0.2241)

Positive

-3.7354*

7.8416**

-3.4817*

-2.8600

(1.5426)

_________(2.3017)

_________(1.6396)

(2.5521)

** and * denote significance at the 1% and 5% level, respectively; number in parenthesis is standard error.

aI1 through I7 indicate ecological dissimilarity indexes, A1 and A2 are agronomic dissimilarity indexes, and ωk,
k=c,s,m, denote lobbying dissimilarity indexes.

29



More intriguing information

1. Keynesian Dynamics and the Wage-Price Spiral:Estimating a Baseline Disequilibrium Approach
2. Une Classe de Concepts
3. Language discrimination by human newborns and by cotton-top tamarin monkeys
4. The name is absent
5. The Importance of Global Shocks for National Policymakers: Rising Challenges for Central Banks
6. The name is absent
7. The name is absent
8. The name is absent
9. The name is absent
10. The name is absent