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26

choosing not to participate in the formal registration system. It has been suggested that they
are doing this because they do not want the central-level government to administer land
(including concessions) in their provinces. It is clear that some of the provinces are
attempting to assert more autonomy from the central government. This may become more
pronounced as Mozambique moves toward elections.'

In addition to those concessions reported in the Boletim, DINAGECA in Maputo also cites
several agricultural concessions granted by the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA). These
concessions total more than 724,000 hectares. It is unclear why they are not cited in the
Boletim. In all, the available data 5s5uggest that the MOA has officially granted concessions
totaling at least 792,000 hectares.

The research project has also attempted to compile data on agricultural land concessions
made at the provincial and district levels. This has been a difficult task since the data are
often unavailable or disputed. District-level government officials frequently mentioned data
on land concessions that were "approved" or in the process of being approved; but when we
attempted to verify these statistics with provincial authorities, we were often told that they
were incorrect or had not been reported. We were able to gather data from selected districts
in Nampula, Gaza, Manica, Maputo, and Inhambane provinces. These data serve as important
indicators of which provinces are making land concessions and the magnitude of the
concessions being made. Although the largest concessions, covering the greatest area, are
being made at the central level, a substantial number of agricultural concessions covering
large areas are being made at the provincial level. Graph 3 illustrates this phenomenon.

According to the Boletim and DINAGECA in Maputo, 56 only 6,981 hectares of
agricultural land have been granted in Gaza Province. But for about the same period of time,
the province contends that it has granted more than 170,000 hectares. In 1986, the
Boletim
and DINAGECA listed agricultural land concessions totaling approximately 13,145 hectares
in the province of Nampula, 57 while the province reports that it granted nearly 75,000
hectares for just 7 of its 18 districts for the period 1990 to 1993.
58 The Boletim cites no
concessions for Manica Province; however, DINAGECA cites agricultural concessions
totaling 46,957 hectares. The province itself indicates that it granted 126,259 hectares of
agricultural land in concessions in the period 1988 to 1993. In Maputo, the Provincial Office
of Agriculture counts land concessions totaling nearly 200,000 hectares, while the central

54. This is also an indication of the government's attempt, following the 4th Party Congress, to decentralize
certain administrative functions. Normally we would consider this a positive move; however, the central govern-
ment is often unaware of what is
happening at the provincial level and frequently grants competitive concessions.
In addition, this lack of communication means that central government is less able to demand compliance with
any tax, investment, environmental, or other national law that affects the overall welfare of the country.

55. See DINAGECA (1993). This document is unclear, but it suggests that the MOA has approved
approximately 100 concessions that have not been reported in the Boletim. It is possible that some of these
concessions are for residential or industrial property; however, the number of nonagricultural concessions is
thought to be small.

56. See DINAGECA (1993).

57. The last year in which land concessions for Nampula are reportedin the Boletim daRepublica is 1986.

58. These districts include Ribaue, Malema, Mecuburi, Lalaua, Angoche, Monapo, and Nampula.



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