44
to political and economic changes, land markets are emerging and evolving in rural
Mozambique. 93
In some FRELIMO-controlled areas customary authorities were strongly repressed or
attacked; in others localities they were allowed (or succeeded in achieving) a certain degree
of independence from the state and some freedom of operation." In RENAMO areas,
authorities were allowed to exist but were exploited for the organization's own political and
military objectives. There is strong evidence that both FRELIMO and R95ENAMO are
currently exploiting customary authorities to support their postwar purposes.
In some areas customary authorities have maintained strong control over land and other
resources since independence, while in other areas their authority has withered as a result of
government and RENAMO interference, war, or social and economic pressure. In still other
areas new relationships of cooperation have developed between local customary authorities
and locality-level government officials. In some instances customary officials have infiltrated
the lower levels of state government (e.g., in Gaza and Maputo provinces) and influenced
land distribution; in other areas locality-level officials have deferred to customary authorities
over the distribution of these resources (e.g., in parts of Manica, Sofala, and Zambezia
provinces). We are just beginning to learn how these authorities have interacted with
RENAMO and how this interaction is changing in the postwar period"
Customary authorities in Mozambique do not have an officially sanctioned role in the
process of land distribution. Indeed, with regard to land distribution to commercial interests,
customary authorities are rarely encouraged by formal administrators to become involved in
the process; more frequently they are isolated or ignored. As noted earlier, this negative
attitude toward customary authorities and institutions is not new.
Research revealed cases in which locality or district authorities distributed land to
smallholder and larger commercial farmers, ignoring local leaders and customary rules of
acquisition and occupation. Land distributed to smallholders was usually given for a set time
period; the rights were temporary. This was witnessed in Manica, Sofala, and Gaza
provinces. Government officials identified "vacant" or "unoccupied" land and distributed it
to "needy" farmers or outside private interests. This often started a cycle of displacement and
reacquisition of land, where the formal authorities displaced one group in favor of another,
only to be forced into finding new lands (often again on a temporary basis) for those they had
93. See Roth, Boucher, and Francisco (1994) for a discussion of informal land markets in Maputo Province.
Also, rural land markets were noted in Sofala, Manica, and Gaza provinces by the LTC research team; see
Tanner, Myers, and Oad (1993); Boucher et al. (1994); and Roth et al. (1994).
94. See, for example, Geffray (1990); Sidaway (1992); and Hanlon (1990). Also, Joao Carrilho, personal
communication, April 1992.
95. See, for example, Alexander (1994); Cahen (1987); and Geffray (1990); also, Ken Wilson, personal
communication, December 1993; and Jocelyn Alexander, personal communication, August 1993. Confirmed
reports suggest that both parties are actively manipulating these authorities as part of their respective political
campaigns during elections.
96. See Alexander (1994); and Wilson (1991d, 1992a, 1992c).