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many commercial farm holders are in fact not currently farming their lands (i.e., they are
speculating), are underutilizing their land, or are unable to exploit their concession profitably,
then it appears that this justification is unwarranted and requires reevaluation. However, it
is naive to assume that such concessions are being granted simply on a "capacity to farm"
basis. Other factors, including personal accumulation and corruption, are presumably fueling
the land concessions being granted.
The case of LOMACO's land acquisition is of particular concern. After the government
granted permission to LOMACO to expand in the area described as LOMACO-2, it is unclear
whether the government itself failed to find new land or compensate local farmers for their
losses or whether LOMACO was supposed to compensate local farmers. Local government
officials in Chokwe also reported that they had not favored the enterprise's expansion in the
area and had tried to prevent it. In any case, it is particularly worrisome that the government
would permit the dislocation of smallholders in favor of a joint-venture enterprise, and
specifically one that has had several unprofitable years Further, LOMACO's expansion as
described above has led to great tenure insecurity in the area, since local smallholders and
small private commercial farmers fear that the enterprise will soon control all land in the area
near LOMACO-2. This situation can only inhibit smallholder and private investment. Since
smallholders and other private interests are not confident of their tenure security, they will
not be inclined to make long-term investments, instead focusing on short-term gains. This
degradation strategy often results in poor resource management and ecological
As part of our analysis, we need to determine if LOMACO has satisfied the terms of its
contractual arrangement. In order to do this, we need the terms of the agreement; up to the
present, however, neither LOMACO nor the government has disclosed this information.
Additionally, the enterprise has not been forthcoming regarding its profitability (or,
conversely, its losses) in Chokwe or elsewhere in the country.
Smallholders in the area are well aware of the government's participation in LOMACO.
As noted, the government is frequently cited as a central antagonist in the region. Indeed,
smallholders interviewed complained that the government was facilitating theft of their land
by private interests and joint ventures. One example will demonstrate this point. A group of
farmers who participated in a group interview professed that "party" (i.e., FRELIMO)
representatives had visited them before LOMACO expanded operations in 1991. Government
(and sometimes FRELIMO) representatives reportedly also accompany private and large
139. Mozambican members of LOMACO's managing board of directors report that the company has not
been profitable for several years between 1990 and 1994. Another government official admitted that the company
was drawing credit from the Central Bank of Mozambique, which could be used more productively elsewhere
in the economy (see also Myers and West 1993). These sources asked to remain anonymous. In a series of
debates with the Land Tenure Center (verbal and written communications), LOMACO officials deny that the
company is unprofitable, asserting that it has brought "development" to the region. LOMACO refuses to open
its books to financial scrutiny, despite the fact that it is a joint-venture company with the Government of
Mozambique. Consequently, we are forced to rely on the comments of Mozambicans involved in the LOMACO
operations, without recourse to the actual documents in question. (Any documents that have been gathered by
the LTC project in Mozambique, including written communications with LOMACO, are available through the
Land Tenure Center, University of Wisconsin-Madison.)
140. See Myers and Tanner (1992); and Tanner, Myers, and Oad (1993).