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However, in practice, the fund should also authorize any buyer to sell the leasehold, even
before the year was up, to any person who would have been eligible to buy at the auction. For sales
during the first year, the price would be the price originally bid at the auction, less the unpaid debt,
which the new buyer would assume. In addition, the new buyer would pay the seller any mutually
agreed-upon amount for improvements made since the purchase at auction. The object is to obtain the
highest possible price at the auction while ensuring that the land is in fact farmed. If the first buyer
is unable for any reason to bring the land into appropriate use, he or she should sell it to someone else
who can and will do so. Thus, the fund should seldom, if ever, actually need to recover a farm itself.
As long as the parcel has been sold at auction, not given away free to a favored few as in the past,
the price on resale will not be very different from the auction price, and hence there is no need to
control it. Once the year-end inspection has verified that the buyer has placed the land in production,
there would be no further need for supervision. And any owner who wanted to sell or sublet the
leasehold would be allowed to do so, just like any other small farmer.
5. Potential buyers and sellers
Since a more fluid, transparent land market would enhance Zambian development and the
welfare of small farmers, the fund should invite anyone who would like to buy a farm or smallholding
that becomes available to put his or her name on a list of candidates. This list would be made available
to anyone, not just buyers at auction, that may want to sell land in small parcels. Likewise, the fund
should invite other landholders, as well as any of its own buyers who change their minds, to advise
the public, estate agents, and others that they are interested in selling and would like to receive offers.
In this simple way, the LDF could do much to increase the efficiency of the Zambian land market,
and reduce the cost, in time as well as money, required for someone who wants to find and buy a
small farm in order to make it produce.
VIII. Summary, conclusions, and recommendations
A. Summary and conclusions
The land market in Zambia is by all accounts more visible than it was three years ago, but it
is still far from efficient. People who seek access to land for productive purposes still have trouble
identifying some of the land that would serve their needs, and people who think they have secure
access to a specific piece of land, but have not yet built a substantial building or are using it, may find
that access revoked on ground that they are not "using" it to the satisfaction of government. The
converse also applies. A government functionary may decide that a piece of land is not being used and
therefore may revoke its lease and promise the land to someone else. However, the new leaseholder
may be informed before actually getting possession that the former leaseholder has appealed to the
courts, leaving the whole issue without resolution.
In another example of the insecurity of possession of leaseholds on state land, a person who
advertises the availability of vacant land suited to commercial or industrial use attracts the attention
of a functionary. That functionary may cancel the original leasehold without compensation, on grounds
that the previous leaseholder is not using the land, which had been a condition of the lease. Naturally,
leaseholders who have not yet developed the land will once again hesitate to advertise their willingness
to sell. These incidents happen frequently enough that it is fair to say that the land market is still