141
the remaining installments. The only exceptions to payment of full value should be persons who are
clearly disadvantaged, a category that does not include the high officials and other insiders who have
often received lands assigned administratively in the past. Even the disadvantaged should make some
payment, and there should be a provision to recapture the subsidy element should they leave the land
and sublease or transfer it to someone else.
2. Discretionary investment
SeCtiOn 20(8) says: "Any money which is not immediately required for any of the purposes
set out...above, may be invested at the discretion of the Ministers responsible for the administration
of the Fund." Given the breadth of the proposed objectives, it is unlikely that the fund would have
"moneys not immediately required for any of the purposes set out." However, given the total
discretion the draft law offers the ministers, it is not hard to imagine that future ministers, wanting
to do something entirely different from the purposes of the LDF, might be tempted to decide not to
pursue its purposes, in order to "invest" the money in something else. Worse, this provision appears
to allow the four ministers absolute and total discretion. They could decide to invest in banks paying
less interest than Treasury bills or less than the highest rates currently available at other banks. It
would appear that they could even invest in loans to private businesses. If questioned, the attorney
general might be forced to say that this was permitted by the law, if enacted with the present wording.
Since this is surely not the intent of the drafters of the law, the wording should be changed to avoid
any doubt.
Other countries generally have transparent, professionally managed provisions to invest
government agency funds not currently needed. There is no reason to require the managers or
directors of the LDF itself to make decisions on short-term investment of government funds. This is
part of the job of a treasurer, who manages balances for all government agencies. For example, some
countries specify that all funds of parastatals, which the fund somewhat resembles, not required for
disbursement within the week, must be held in an account in the central or state bank. This reduces
the amount of money in circulation and hence at least contributes to controlling inflation. It also
reduces the opportunities for corruption, and lets the fund directors concentrate on their main task,
land development.
3. Accountability and transparency
The draft law provides, in SeC. 20(9), for annual financial statements to be provided only to
the very government officials in charge of the fund: "The Ministers responsible for the administration
of the Fund shall ensure that an annual statement of the income and expenditure is prepared and
furnished to the President and all the four Ministers responsible for the Fund." Drafted this way, the
law does not provide for:
► conducting an independent, outside, annual audit of the accounts;
► making these accounts available to the public through timely publication in the press, as banks
do; nor
► submitting audited financial statements to parliament, nor to anyone other than the very
persons who are given authority to spend moneys in the fund.
If these omissions are not corrected, the public will be unable to determine whether funds have
been spent honestly and wisely. Given the history of some other state funds, the public might assume