The name is absent

Table 1: EU’s MFN import regime for oranges

Sources: European Commission (2005a), own calculations.

The substantial seasonal differences of the external market regulation for oranges imply that
the northern hemisphere suppliers are confronted with stronger import restrictions than the
southern hemisphere suppliers. Since 2001, northern hemisphere suppliers have to accord
with an average ad valorem tariff of 10.9% during their main export season from January to
June, which is significantly higher than the average ad valorem tariff of 4.3% southern
hemisphere suppliers are confronted with throughout their export season from June to
November. Southern hemisphere suppliers have to correspond with a substantial ad valorem
tariff from October 16 to November 31 exclusively, amounting to 16% since 2001. Also,
northern hemisphere suppliers have to comply with the entry price system from January to
May, thus during almost their complete export season, whereas the entry price system is not at
all effective during the southern hemisphere suppliers’ season.

2.2.2 Trade preferences

EU trade preferences for oranges are mainly granted to the MED, who are the major northern
hemisphere orange suppliers to the EU. The primary southern hemisphere suppliers as e.g.
South Africa and Brazil do not enjoy preferential orange market access. The only exception
under the southern hemisphere suppliers are Zimbabwe and Swaziland which are allowed a
80% reduction in ad valorem tariff since 2000.

The EU warrants trade preferences for oranges by three kinds of instruments. A general tariff
reduction lowers the MFN ad valorem tariff by a certain percentage for any amount of orange
exports. A tariff rate quota (TRQ) and a entry price quota (EPQ) are both limited
quantitatively, meaning that they are applicable only up to a certain export amount as
specified by the quota. Similarly to the general tariff reduction, the TRQ allows a particular
percentage of MFN tariff reduction. The EPQ gives a lowered entry price in addition to a 100
percent ad valorem tariff reduction.

In general, preferential access to the EU orange market might induce a competitive advantage
for the preference receiving country’s exporters against non-preference receiving countries’
exporters. Also, trade preferences might diminish the competitive disadvantage of the
preference receiving country’s exporters relative to the protected EU domestic suppliers. In
particular, a preferential tariff may increase exporters’ profits by raising the export price. A
preferential entry price might allow utilizing a cost advantage if the produce can profitably be
supplied to the EU market at a price below the MFN entry price.

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