Table 3: Preferential entry price for oranges (in commercial ECU/€ per 100 kg)
Marketing year |
94/95 |
95/96 |
96/97 |
97/98 |
98/99 |
99/00 |
00/01 |
01/02 |
02/03 |
03/04 |
04/05 |
MFN EP |
27.5 (RP*) |
36.9 |
36.6 |
36.3 |
36.0 |
35.7 |
35.4 |
35.4 |
35.4 |
35.4 |
35.4 |
Pref. EP |
- |
27.5 |
27.3 |
27.1 |
26.8 |
26.6 |
26.4 |
26.4 |
26.4 |
26.4 |
26.4 |
% of MFN EP |
- |
74.5 |
74.6 |
74.7 |
74.4 |
74.5 |
74.6 |
74.6 |
74.6 |
74.6 |
74.6 |
RP = reference price; Source: European Commission (2005a).
*
To sum up, the EU import regime for oranges is highly complex and evolved in a multitude of
separate agreements and regulations. All MED may export oranges to the EU within the
respective quotas tariff free since 1993. Also, orange exports enter the EU at preferential entry
prices for Morocco and Israel since December 1995, Egypt since December 1996 and Cyprus
since December 1997. Thus, Morocco and Israel, the largest MED orange exporters, had at no
time to adhere with the relatively high MFN entry price. Further, the MED trade preferences
for oranges did not erode relatively to those of Spain and Portugal until December 1993.
3 Analysis of the effectiveness of the EU import system for oranges
3.1 Relationship between the EU import price and the entry price for oranges
To analyze whether and how the EU entry price impacts the EU import price for oranges, and
thus the domestic orange market price, the standard import value (SIV) of oranges, an
indicator for the import price, is compared to the entry price. The European Commission
calculates the SIV daily based on the weighted average of wholesale market prices, minus a
marketing and transportation margin and the custom duties, surveyed by origin of the produce
in all EU countries (for further details see OJ 1994, L337/66, Regulation 3223/94).
This analysis is based on about 5,500 observations of the SIV for the orange exporting MED,
including Morocco, Israel, Tunisia, Egypt, Cyprus and Turkey, with about 600 to 1,100
observations for each individual country (Figure 3). Each single dot corresponds to the SIV of
oranges originating in a particular country at given date. The data set includes SIV
observations from December 1, 1995, when the entry price system was first introduced, until
May 31, 2005. The gaps in the data correspond to the SIVs surveyed exclusively when the
entry price system is in effect, i.e. from December 1 until May 31.
Figure 3 uncovers directly that the vast majority of observations lies distinctively above the
MFN entry price. Few SIV observations lie below the MFN entry price and even less are
lower than the preferential entry price. In particular, the share of SIV observations that exceed
the MFN entry price is highest for Israel with 99.9%, followed by Cyprus with 98.7%,
Tunisia 97.2% and Morocco 93% (Table 4).
For Morocco and Israel, none of those observations lies below the applied entry price which is
the preferential entry price introduced on December 1, 1995. This means that the special tariff
was not at all imposed on Moroccan or Israeli oranges in this time period. For Cyprus 2
observations and Tunisia 24 observations lie below the respective entry price. The special
tariff was most frequently applied to Egyptian oranges with 31 and Turkey with 90
observations, corresponding to 4.2% and 8.0% of all observations respectively.