fruits and vegetables. Nevertheless, rejections on fruits and vegetables are among the
most important components of total EU rejections. Since no other country specific data
are available Table 6 might at least give a rough idea. This implies two possible
scenarios. First, large exporters might show higher rejections due to the larger quantity
exported. Second, larger exporters might show particularly low rejections since they are
already well adapted to the food safety requirements of their trading partners.
Even though the picture presented in Table 6 is diverse, it shows a tendency of large
exporter clusters having a higher average amount of border rejections. Nevertheless, the
structure within the groups is heterogeneous. As an example, cluster 30 (very large
exporters and strong winners) includes two countries with very high border rejections
(Mexico with 886 rejections from the US and China with 357 rejections form the US and
443 from the EU) but at the same time, Chile shows only 14 border rejections from the
US and 60 from the EU. This is a difference in the number of rejections that can be
explained neither by the differences in the exported quantities, nor by differences in
export dynamics. Instead, it illustrates very different export strategies regarding
standards.
As another example, cluster 100 depicts the rejections of Thailand, the largest exporter
with losses in market share in the fruit/ vegetable market. The number of 275 rejections
from the EU is relatively high. However, its rejections are only one third those of China’ s,
which extended its exports.
Table 6 depicts a diverse picture also for small exporter cluster groups. They all display
very low rejections, independently of whether they belong to a winner or a loser cluster.
The only very small exporter with slightly higher rejection is Nigeria with 25 rejections
from the EU. All other exporters of the cluster groups 3 and 2 note rejections between
zero and four. Nevertheless, the very low level of rejections of these countries is rather
an indicator for their low export orientation than for their good food safety management
systems.
Cluster 4 (small and medium exporters, losers) shows the largest difference between the
minimum level of rejections with 0 and the maximum level with 1049 (yet this cluster is
also the most heterogeneous one concerning export quantity). This large amount of
rejections stems from the Islamic Republic of Iran. According to Henson and Jaffee
(2004) most of the rejections from Iran are due to stricter aflatoxin 15 standards of the
EU. Iran experienced strong problems in respecting the aflatoxin level in recent years
and its exports of edible nuts have declined from some $452 million in 1996 to less than
$210 million in 2002 [9:32]. Iran is followed by Indonesia with 147 EU rejections. All other
exporters of the cluster group have very low to no rejections.
Finally, the question from the beginning of this section whether countries which perform
well on the export market have lower border rejections has to be answered with no. As
depicted in Table 6 the picture of border rejections is very heterogeneous and seems not
to interrelate with an increasing or decreasing export ratio. However, it has to be
admitted, that the level of the analysis is relatively broad. It would consequently be
interesting if there would be a correlation between the export performance and the
border rejections on single product level. In principle, results of Table 6 can be
interpreted in two ways, first, the countries show a high level of border rejections
because of their high level of export orientation (this would be supported by the cluster
30) and small countries tend to show little rejections because of their low participation
on the market and a possible export concentration on products with a lower sensibility
according to food safety requirements (this would be supported by cluster 3 and 2).The
second perspective could be that some large exporters show high border rejections even
though they have such a strong exporting focus. Examples for large exporters with high
border rejections are China and Mexico, while large exporters with low border rejections
are e.g. Brazil and Chile. Anyhow, border rejections are always an indicator for the
inability of a country to comply with the importing countries requirements. Thus, border
rejections imply that the country loses parts of its export gains and possibly does not
exploit its export potential. This could steam from two different reasons. First, countries
with a high level of border rejections might, although they have a very strong export
orientation, show some weaknesses in their food safety and quality management
systems. Second, the countries might export products which faced a particular increase
in food safety measures within the last years. As a consequence the exporting country
has to adopt the new requirements. Consequently, the country faces within the period of
15 Mycotoxins are toxic by- products of mold infestations, affecting as much as a quarter of global
food and feed crop output.
15