On the basis of these empirical results, Cullen and Whelan (1997) argued that there is
a future only for Euro- or global brands, while national brand manufacturers with
brands ranked third or fourth in FMCG markets are faced with the prospect of
continuous share erosion or the choice to specialise either as niche brands or possibly
as private label suppliers.
Similarly, Dobson et al. (2002) pointed out that “the leading suppliers appear better
able to resist retailer pressure to reduce prices. In contrast smaller producers, either
producing secondary brands or own- label products are less able to resist such
pressures and transfer prices appear much closer to competitive levels. The same
authors refer to the risk of being delisted as a typical risk of powerless suppliers.
The differential impact of store brands in relation to the manufacturer brand’ s
strength is confirmed by the literature on price effects of private labels. Several works
in this stream of literature indeed show that while premium- tier national brands are
relatively insulated from store brands entry, consumers of lower- priced national
brands are more likely to switch to store brands (Blattberg and Wisniewski 1989,
Sethuraman et al. 1999). In particular, and more consistently with our prediction, store
brands are more more likely to compete with second- tier brands than with premium-
tier national brands (Dhar and Hoch, 1997; Hoch and Lodish, 2003). Pauwels and
Srinivisan (2004) indicate that manufacturers’ premium brands do not directly
compete with store brands, but instead focus on serving their core quality- conscious
consumer segments by investing in product innovations. In contrast, store brands
harm second- tier manufacturers brands because consumers of these brands are more
likely to switch to store brands. They also find that that premium national brands
maintain their sales level whereas second price- tier brands lose market share to the
store brand.
Market access is becoming particularly difficult for second- tier brands which tend to
become squeezed between the brands characterized by high brand loyalty and tertiary
brands (Harrison, 2000). Few claims illustrate these patterns and the mechanisms at
work as the following words by Niall FitzGerald, then cochairman of Unilever: ”I don’ t
see Wal-Mart as a threat. I see Wal- Mart as a positive opportunity, just as I see Tesco
and Carrefour as an opportunity. They’re a positive opportunity for the relatively
small number of people who have the big brands (...)What the Wal- Marts, Tescos and
Carrefours need are big brands that drive traffic. What they don’ t need are the
secondary brands, the No. 3, 4, 5 and 6. You have to be positioned with the leading
brands in each category the consumers demand or the dominant brands in a niche
category”(Ball, 2004b, p. A7).
The increasing intensity of vertical competition and, as a consequence, the need to
have a portfolio of strong brands in order to maintain an appropriate bargaining
power with retailers explain why even major manufacturers have increasingly adopted
in recent years refocusing strategies to reinforce their core brands eliminating less
successful ones. Indeed, in the U. S., food manufacturers tend to concentrate on their
core activities and to consolidate their positions in markets and product categories
where they currently hold a strong position (Cotterill, 2000; Rogers, 2001).
Similar patterns can be observed in Europe where there is evidence that most brands
fail to achieve the necessary brand loyalty. Recent estimates indicate that no fewer
than 75 per cent of all European brands are under pressure. More or less, this means
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