that only the 25 percent of European brands have sufficient critical mass to sustain
appropriate marketing efforts (Jones, McLaughlin and van Ossel, 2002).
According to the Private Label Manufacturers’ Association (PLMA) “Leading
manufacturer brands are struggling to maintain their market share positions and
profitability in Europe in the face of growing private label competition. There is
evidence that several firms have adopted refocusing strategies by reducing the number
of brands in their portfolio. For example, in recent years Unilever has adopted a
drastic restructuring of its portfolio by selling or eliminating 1,200 brands, reducing
the number of brands in portfolio to 400. The purpose was an effort to become more
focused, lean and competitive. As noted by the CEO, in the absence of this strategy “[if
we]were still trundling around with 1,600 brands as the retail continues to consolidate,
we would be dead in the water” (Ball, 2004b). ConAgra Foods Inc. unveiled a
turnaround strategy oriented to simplify the portfolio and that includes boosting
annual marketing spending focusing on brands with the highest potential (Lloyd,
2006).
Industry analysts emphasize that “Anything but the top brands can end up on the
bottom shelf. The big food companies don’t want to be in categories where they are
relegated to the worst display, and they are finding they can’t always manage the vast
array of brands they have collected. So they are selling [...] Nestlé merger- and-
acquisitions team was more focused on divestitures of small business than
acquisitions. Food- company executives are now talking about to “simplify” their
portfolios [.] What really matters is how big you are in a particular category, and
being a star in one aisle doesn’t guarantee respect in another” (Ellison, 2004).
The existence of specific difficulties for secondary brands may also explain the
difficulties of medium- sized manufacturers. Rogers (2001) found that: “[In the U. S.
food industry t]he 100 largest food and tobacco processors accounted for about 75%
of the value- added in 1997, almost doubling their share since 1954. The top 100 is
itself skewed toward the very large, with the top 20 firms accounting for over 50% of
total value- added in 1997, more than doubling its 1967 share (.). The remaining 80
firms among the top 100 firms actually lost share over the last 30 years. The sector is
best described by a big- small model, where extremely large firms control leading
positions in most markets and smaller companies, including startups, operate in a
competitive fringe trying to serve a particular market niche or develop a new idea
.”(pp. 5- 6).
Finally, it is interesting to note that there is also empirical support for Proposition 3,
namely that over time, because on the increasing level of store loyalty, an increasing
number of brands, even the strongest ones, face intense vertical pressures and the risk
of delisting. For example, Brady, Brown e Hulit (2003) noted that in countries and
categories where vertical competition is more developed, even brands in number one
or two position face the risk of delisting. There is indeed evidence that where vertical
competition is more intense, even brands in number one or two position face this risk.
Steiner (2004) quoting Berlinski (1997), pointed out that, over time, it will be possible
to see only two offerings per category on the shelf - the national brand leader and the
store brand. There will be no space available for the second or third brand player in
the category”.
It is important to note that a scenario in which retailers carry a private label plus a
national brand plus a local brand would mean the final collapse of second- tier brands.
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