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would not be emasculated by other domestic regulations or practices. Underlying the formation of these
rules has again been the criterion of equality of opportunity. Countries have sought equivalent treatment.
Along with the procedures for dispute settlement and the use of measures against “unfair” trade, these
constitute the rules of the game and are of great instrumental value in promoting a system of cooperation
in which trade can flourish.
The process of rule formation has been, and continues to be, a fluid one. Since the GATT was
first ratified after World War II, many of the original rules have been repeatedly revisited and revised, and
there have been numerous additions to the rules. Most commentators would doubtless agree that
countries are now more assured of equitable treatment than was the case fifty years ago; there is less
evasion of the formal market-access commitments than there was. But, reflecting the diverse
circumstances of member countries, every step forward has been made in the face of often strongly held
differences of views on what constitutes a fair rule. Progress has been possible when countries have been
able to bridge the gap in their different perceptions of fairness. Their perceptions have not necessarily
merged, but they have been sufficiently close to make possible mutual accommodations for the sake of
the greater trade cooperation from which they all benefit.
Political obstructionism motivated by a self-interested bias has, of course, not been absent in
limiting rule formation. Despite no large differences of perception about fairness, agreement on some
seemingly straightforward matters has sometimes been slow to reach. In the 1950s, for example,
European countries complained about the so-called American selling price method of customs valuation
that the United States used for some chemical products based on the domestic price of an equivalent
product. This issue was apparently resolved during the Kennedy Round (1964-1967) in which agreement
was reached on the use of customs valuation that would assure equal treatment. But the U.S Congress
refused to ratify the agreement, ostensibly on the grounds that the U.S administration had exceeded its
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