The name is absent

30

inescapable — though there could possibly be merit in striving for reciprocity within sectors.²² Still, there
would be some gain in clarity if the fairness of market-access negotiations were assessed separately from
those relating to rule-making and procedural justice. As we have already argued, other standards of
fairness apply to the latter.

A move to adhere more closely to market-access gains, of course, does not address the biases
inherent in preexisting trade barriers or the great disparity in national economic conditions that give rise
to the call for distributive equity. There is, as we have noted, a recognized bias in the trade barriers of
developed countries against many of the products in which the developing countries have a comparative
advantage. Developed countries can claim that the bias is offset by their non-reciprocal preferential
programs and by the less-than-full reciprocity that they concede to developing countries in tariff
negotiations. We suggest, however, that both fairness and efficiency would be better served if, over time,
the bias in trade barriers were progressively removed while developing countries, apart from the low-
income and least developed countries, moved closer toward full reciprocity.

An alternative to removal of the bias in developed countries' trade barriers is to make their non-
reciprocal preferential programs larger and more effective. But it is highly improbable that these
programs are ever likely to be made a more extensive instrument of promoting development in most
developing countries. The successful export performance of a number of these countries alone militates
against their more extensive use. Moreover, if the rationale of these programs is to encourage the
formation and expansion of export-oriented firms and not to transfer income to developing countries, then
the programs seem largely relevant for low income and least developed countries in the early stages of
diversifying their production and exports. These programs have, in addition, undesirable characteristics
when measured by the efficiency criteria. They generate inefficiencies in diverting trade from the lowest
cost producers, and they create overlapping rules of origin. Further, they are not necessarily stable, since
they are extended unilaterally and can be arbitrarily withdrawn. In comparison with multilateralism,

²²An obvious example in services is the right to make temporary transfers of low cost labor in order to fulfill
construction contracts.

<<   29   30   31   32   33   34   35   >>

More intriguing information