IMF and the World Bank, for example, is to discuss specific items of their decision
agendas in depth and length, and then approve or disapprove the proposals under
consideration without formal votes, when it becomes clear in which direction the
(weighted) majority of the Directors is going. The formal votes are few and far between.
The minutes of Board meetings do not reflect the yes/no votes cast by the single, or
groups, of shareholders represented in them4 , but only the abstentions or the rejections
(i.e. the contrary votes) when the shareholder in question so requests specifically.
Therefore, precise reconstruction, and quantitative analysis, of decisions taken inside
these institutions are not possible, even if one could obtain minutes of past Board
meetings. Actual voting patterns are not there to be analyzed, and hypotheses about them
cannot be formulated and statistically tested.
Views held on who runs the IFIs
Views are nonetheless often expressed on who holds the most influence in these
institutions. Some of them are held with particular vigor. The United States, the G-7, the
United States-Europe acting in concert are often identified as the critical power holders in
both the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (Woods, 2003)5 . In many
ways they are, as more extensively argued below. There is even a widespread outside
perception that the United States holds an unusual amount of power in one or both of
them.6 Japan is often credited as a major influence in the Asian Development Bank, and
the United States again in the Inter-American Development Bank.
These views are often expresses critically, both outside and inside the various “circles of
power”. Claire Short, then Minister of Development Cooperation in the United Kingdom,
is reported to have said “the US gets the World Bank and Europe gets the IMF.....What
about the rest of the world? This is disgraceful”(Bretton Woods Project, 2002). This
statement regarded apparently the informal power sharing agreement that has held so far,
between Europe and the United Sates, on the selection of the Heads of the two
institutions.7 Since both the President of the World Bank and the Managing Director
4 Apart from the five major shareholders (United States, Japan, Germany, France and the United Kingdom,
plus Saudi Arabia Russia and China for historical reasons, that hold individual seats in the 24 members
Boards, all other countries group together in constituencies and elect an Executive Director that represents
them on the two Boards.
5 This author argues that at the core of US influence lies the financial structures of the two institutions.
Additional resources to the capital of the IMF and aid resources to IDA do in fact need the consent of the
United States because of the above-mentioned 85% rule of decision.
6 A recent survey of 2600 opinion leaders in 48 countries, for example, found that they believed that the
World Bank was too much influenced by the United States .
7 According to which the United States as the largest shareholder on both the World Bank and the IMF
(with about 17% of the capital) select a candidate for the Presidency of the World Bank Group, whom the
(Western) Europeans (and Japan) support, and the Europeans (the largest bloc of share holders in both,
with a combined capital shares of over 30% of the total) select a candidate for the Directorship of the
IMF, whom the United States (and Japan) support. This “pact” arrived at when Japan was a minor
shareholder non longer reflect current realities, since Japan has now over 6% of quotas in the Bank and the
Fund.