Table 2 : Econometric results Dependent variable lit - sample period 1994-2000
|
Belgium Denmark |
Spain |
Finland |
France |
Germany |
Italy |
The |
Norway |
Sweden |
United | ||
|
N. of obs. |
2471 |
479 |
2058 |
280 |
7739 |
1239 |
5203 |
913 |
1164 |
1664 |
17957 |
|
N. of firms |
493 |
225 |
679 |
124 |
2219 |
313 |
1194 |
224 |
410 |
922 |
3749 |
|
(Ух ) |
0.908*** |
0.679* |
0.643*** |
0.217 |
0.313*** |
0.476* |
0.410*** |
0.768* |
0.153** |
0.449 |
0.871*** |
|
lit-1 |
(0.211) |
(0.381) |
(0.132) |
(0.237) |
(0.053) |
(0.280) |
(0.074) |
(0.407) |
(0.046) |
(0.153) |
(0.078) |
|
(У 6) |
-0.708*** |
-0.751* |
-0.625*** |
-0.246 |
-0.318*** |
-0.394 |
-0.411*** |
-0.632 |
-0.127* |
-0.456 |
-0.787*** |
|
mne ■ lit-1 |
(0.216) |
(0.387) |
(0.133) |
(0.238) |
(0.061) |
(0.286) |
(0.078) |
(0.410) |
(0.074) |
(0.161) |
(0.081) |
|
(У 4 ) |
-0.533*** |
-0.737*** |
-1.056*** |
-0.416 |
-0.909*** |
-0.881*** |
-0.961*** |
-0.583*** |
-0.751*** |
-0.310* |
-0.459*** |
|
wit |
(0.114) |
(0.147) |
(0.137) |
(0.307) |
(0.055) |
(0.157) |
(0.117) |
(0.152) |
(0.067) |
(0.161) |
(0.058) |
|
(У 9 ) |
0.083 |
0.306** |
0.321** |
-0.128 |
0.180** |
0.170 |
0.060 |
0.110 |
0.068 |
-0.7190 |
0.024 |
|
mne ■ wtt -1 |
(0.122) |
(0.151) |
(0.152) |
(0.275) |
(0.074) |
(0.163) |
(0.120) |
(0.165) |
(0.103) |
(0.175) |
(0.080) |
|
(У 2 ) |
0.196** |
0.612*** |
0.311*** |
0.496*** |
0.639*** |
0.680*** |
0.596*** |
0.512*** |
0.375*** |
0.511*** |
0.519*** |
|
Уи |
(0.073) |
(0.081) |
(0.078) |
(0.086) |
(0.040) |
(0.109) |
(0.070) |
(0.119) |
(0.091) |
(0.078) |
(0.046) |
|
(У 7 ) |
0.135 |
-0.192** |
0.296** |
-0.103 |
-0.065 |
-0.119 |
0.132 |
-0.070 |
0.071 |
0.140 |
0.014 |
|
mne ■ Уlt -i |
(0.093) |
(0.090) |
(0.095) |
(0.132) |
(0.056) |
(0.135) |
(0.087) |
(0.129) |
(0.111) |
(0.127) |
(0.055) |
|
(У 3) |
0.215** |
-0.007 |
0.185** |
-0.025 |
0.226*** |
0.196** |
0.320*** |
0.177 |
0.183** |
0.019 |
-0.031 |
|
rtt |
(0.104) |
(0.190) |
(0.081) |
(0.132) |
(0.039) |
(0.081) |
(0.056) |
(0.138) |
(0.079) |
(0.137) |
(0.037) |
|
(У 8 ) |
-0.122 |
-0.148 |
-0.035 |
0.097 |
0.002 |
-0.209* |
0.000 |
-0.042 |
-0.238* |
0.098 |
-0.040 |
|
mne ■ ri, 1 tt —1 |
(0.099) |
(0.160) |
(0.048) |
(0.165) |
(0.026) |
(0.077) |
(0.032) |
(0.138) |
(0.126) |
(0.163) |
(0.033) |
|
(.7 5 ) |
-0.059*** |
-0.037 |
-0.080 |
0.010 |
-0.031*** |
0.016 |
-0.048** |
-0.019 |
-0.010 |
-0.016 |
-0.021** |
|
T |
(0.015) |
(0.028) |
(0.117) |
(0.040) |
(0.008) |
(0.024) |
(0.016) |
(0.024) |
(0.050) |
(0.020) |
(0.009) |
|
(У10) |
0.002 |
0.030 |
0.021** |
0.004 |
0.009** |
-0.041** |
0.021* |
0.004 |
-0.001 |
-0.012 |
0.019*** |
|
mne ■ T |
(0.009) |
(0.023) |
(0.013) |
(0.016) |
(0.004) |
(0.018) |
(0.012) |
(0.011) |
(0.012) |
(0.019) |
(0.004) |
|
AR1 |
0.008 |
0.145 |
0.0006 |
0.759 |
0.000 |
0.013 |
0.001 |
0.075 |
0.005 |
0.006 |
0.000 |
|
AR2 |
0.317 |
0.369 |
0.918 |
0.245 |
0.811 |
0.627 |
0.180 |
0.514 |
0.551 |
0.676 |
0.989 |
|
Sargan test |
0.330 |
1.000 |
0.484 |
0.960 |
0.150 |
0.089 |
0.330 |
0.067 |
0.880 |
1.000 |
0.030 |
Robust standard errors in parentheses - Time dummies and controls by size and sector included - GMM results are one-step
estimates with heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and test statistics - AR1 and AR2 are tests for first order and
second order serial correlation, P-values are reported - Sargan is a test of the overidentifying restrictions for the GMM
estimators, the P-values reported refer to the two-step GMM estimators. *** statistically significant at 99 percent confidence
level; ** statistically significant at 95 percent confidence level; * statistically significant at 90 percent confidence level
11
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