The name is absent



adoption. Our “priori” is that countries which decide to adopt an IMF programme
will be more likely than others to obtain a debt rescheduling.

We have taken into account particular kinds of IMF programmes, that is
Stand by arrangements, Extended Fund Facility (EFF), Structural Adjustment
Facilities (SAF) and Enhanced Structural Fund Facility (ESAF) loans. As we
said, they were chosen because they are set both for the short and the medium-
term, both for medium and low income countries and they aim at overcoming
both temporary and structural balance of payments maladjustment s. The adop-
tion of one of these Fund programmes is considered only if it has occurred in
the period 1985-’94. The choice of this peri od is due to the consideration that
international debt strategy has shifted towards a policy more oriented to concede
debt restructuring (respect to one more oriented to providing new loans) only in
the late eighties.

Moreover, since some of these countries have adhered to an IMF programme
more than once during the sample peri od, we have taken into account only their
latest arrangement. The variable which denotes whether a country has obtained
an IMF programme is
I ; where I is equal one if the country has got the IMF
lending and conditionality package and equal zero otherwise.12

As a measure of the debt rescheduling we used the “private interest and
principal rescheduled” series.13 The variable which represents debt reschedulings
is
C, where C = 1 if the country has rescheduled a part of its commercial debt
within not more than one year since the adoption of the programme (and in
any case after the IMF programme has started).14 One year cut o∏ was chosen
12 Actually, the data does not allow us to distinguish between the two alternatives: apply and
do not get the loan and do not apply for the loan. So we are able to know only t he resulting
outcome.

13We did not include o^ial reschedulings as adoption of an IMF programme is actually a
formal pre-requisite for obtaining t hem and this would introduce a bias in our results.

14If a cou ntry actually gets a debt concession only before adhering to the IMF programme
(but not after the adhesion), C will be set equal 0. Moreover, if, in the case of no adoption, a
country gets more than one concession, we considered only the most recent.

17



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