The name is absent

tion ofan IMF programme on the subsequent concession ofa debt rescheduling by
commercial creditors, using a bivariate probit model to control for the endogene-
ity of the choice “IMF adoption.” If countries who adopt IMF programmes are
more likely than others to obtain a restructuring of their external debt, we could
conclude that the adoption of a Fund programme could work as a sort of signal
of a country’s “good behaviour” which is then followed by the debt rescheduling.
Our results con...rm the existence of this eaect.

We will consider the following IMF programmes, that is Stand by arrange-
ments, Extended Fund Facility (EFF), Str uctural Adjustment Facilities (SAF)
and Enhanced Structural Fund Facility (ESAF)⁴. These programmes were chosen
since they are the most common among IMF programmes. They are set both for
the short and the medium-term and are designed for both middle-income (Stand
by and EFF) and low-income countries (SAF and ESAF programmes). Our de-
.nition of a debt rescheduling includes commercial banks reschedulings (interest
and/or principal component).

In Section 2we provide some background to the empirical studies on the de-
terminants of both Fund arrangements and external debt repayment performance.
We then, in Section 3, brie≠y describe the main features of the theoretical model,
while Section 4 develops the empirical one. Section 5 presents the main results
and, .nally, Section 6 concludes.

⁴Eaective November 1999, ESAF was actually renamed Poverty Reduction and Growth Fa-
cility (PRGF).

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