|
Table 19 |
CGE estimated net GDP effect of preferential and unilateral tariff liberalization and NTB | ||||||||
|
liberalization |
(billions of US dollars, equivalent variation |
measure) | |||||||
|
Reversion of preferentials |
Reversion of nontariff barrier rates |
Reversion to 1990 tariffs | |||||||
|
Terms of |
Overall |
Terms of |
Overall |
Terms of |
Overall | ||||
|
Country/region Efficiency |
trade |
effect |
Efficiency |
trade |
effect |
Efficiency |
trade |
effect | |
|
Australia |
-0.2 |
0.2 |
0.0 |
-3.1 |
-0.2 |
-3.3 |
-1.9 |
0.2 |
-1.7 |
|
Brazil |
0.1 |
0.4 |
0.5 |
-6.3 |
0.4 |
-6.0 |
-4.3 |
1.4 |
-3.0 |
|
Canada |
-1.8 |
-1.3 |
-3.1 |
-4.5 |
-4.1 |
-8.6 |
-2.9 |
-0.1 |
-3.0 |
|
China |
0.3 |
1.8 |
2.1 |
-14.5 |
-0.2 |
-14.7 |
-38.2 |
28.3 |
-9.9 |
|
EU-15 |
1.6 |
4.7 |
6.3 |
-84.0 |
1.1 |
-82.9 |
-29.2 |
1.2 |
-28.0 |
|
Hong Kong |
0.0 |
0.0 |
0.0 |
-0.3 |
-1.6 |
-1.9 |
-0.0 |
-3.2 |
-3.3 |
|
India |
0.1 |
0.3 |
0.3 |
-4.7 |
1.2 |
-3.5 |
-13.9 |
10.2 |
-3.6 |
|
Indonesia |
0.0 |
0.1 |
0.1 |
-1.7 |
-0.6 |
-2.3 |
-1.5 |
0.4 |
-1.2 |
|
Japan |
0.3 |
2.3 |
2.6 |
-16.4 |
1.9 |
-14.5 |
-2.0 |
-1.9 |
-3.9 |
|
Korea |
0.1 |
0.8 |
0.9 |
-6.5 |
-0.0 |
-6.5 |
-3.1 |
1.4 |
-1.7 |
|
Malaysia |
0.0 |
0.2 |
0.2 |
-7.7 |
-5.1 |
-12.8 |
-0.6 |
-3.9 |
-4.5 |
|
Mexico |
-3.5 |
-1.5 |
-5.0 |
-14.0 |
0.6 |
-13.4 |
-8.1 |
0.9 |
-7.1 |
|
Philippines |
0.0 |
0.1 |
0.1 |
-4.9 |
0.3 |
-4.6 |
-1.0 |
0.4 |
-0.7 |
|
Singapore |
-0.0 |
-0.3 |
-0.3 |
-0.4 |
-1.8 |
-2.2 |
-0.2 |
-3.9 |
-4.1 |
|
Taiwan |
0.0 |
0.4 |
0.4 |
-17.7 |
-0.4 |
-18.1 |
-0.9 |
-1.8 |
-2.7 |
|
Thailand |
0.0 |
0.1 |
0.2 |
-0.7 |
-1.5 |
-2.2 |
-5.1 |
0.9 |
-4.2 |
|
Venezuela |
0.0 |
0.0 |
0.1 |
-0.3 |
-0.3 |
-0.6 |
-0.1 |
-0.3 |
-0.4 |
|
United States |
-1.8 |
-10.9 |
-12.7 |
-28.9 |
24.4 |
-4.5 |
-3.5 |
-5.0 |
-8.5 |
|
Rest of world |
0.7 |
2.4 |
3.1 |
-2.3 |
-14.1 |
-16.4 |
-4.8 |
-26.0 |
-30.8 |
|
Total |
-4.2 |
-218.9 |
-122.3 | ||||||
Notes: These results are interpreted in the same way as table 18. The model predicts big terms of trade swings for the larger economies in the NTB
simulations, but only for the United States are the favorable swings large enough to roughly balance the allocative efficiency losses. The reversion of
preferentials scenario entails elimination of the US trade agreements with Australia, Canada, Mexico, and Singapore.
Source: Gilbert (2009) calculations using GTAP7 database.
35